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Game representations for state constrained continuous
time linear regulator problems∗
Peter M. Dower† William M. McEneaney‡ Michael Cantoni†
Abstract
A supremum-of-quadratics representation for convex barrier-type constraints is developed and
applied within the context of a class of continuous time state constrained linear regulator prob-
lems. Using this representation, it is shown that a linear regulator problem subjected to such a
convex barrier-type constraint can be equivalently formulated as an unconstrained two-player linear
quadratic game. By demonstrating equivalence of the upper and lower values of this game, state
feedback characterizations for the optimal policies of both players are developed. These character-
izations are subsequently illustrated by example.
1 Introduction
The study of unconstrained continuous time linear quadratic regulator (LQR) problems has provided
the foundation of numerous advances in systems theory over many decades, including in optimal
control [1], and in the development of practical receding horizon / model predictive control strategies
[2]. The value function that attends their formulation as an optimal control problem is guaranteed
to be finite everywhere on sufficiently short time horizons, and is quadratic in the initial state, see
for example [1, 3]. Indeed, it is well known that the Hessian of the value function is characterized in
terms of the unique solution of a corresponding final value problem defined by a differential Riccati
equation (DRE) subject to a terminal condition set by the Hessian of the terminal payoff. Standard
tools exist for the efficient solution of DREs, and thus continuous time LQR problems.
The introduction of state constraints into LQR problems fundamentally impacts their solvability.
Indeed, the nonlinearity inherent in such a constraint naturally destroys the quadratic structure that
underpins the solvability of LQR problems via DREs. Instead, the value functions involved are in-
herently non-quadratic, and satisfy a more general non-stationary Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB)
partial differential equation (PDE). It is well-known that HJB PDEs are difficult to solve for non-
linear regulator problems, and that computational strategies that attend their solution suffer from a
curse-of-dimensionality [4]. These difficulties limit the imposition of state constraints in continuous
time LQR problems.
In this paper, implementation of a simple state constraint in an otherwise standard finite dimen-
sional continuous time LQR problem is considered. Specifically, in addition to the standard linear
open-loop dynamics and quadratic costs, a general convex barrier function is introduced with a view
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to constraining the state to a ball in the state space. By employing what is effectively a convex
relaxation, an alternative solution strategy for such problems is explored via the study of a related
unconstrained two-player game. Fundamental to this exploration is the development of an exact
sup(remum)-of-quadratics representation for the introduced convex barrier function. In this represen-
tation, the associated non-quadratic state penalty is expressed as the supremum of a parameterized
family of quadratic penalties. The parameter identifying elements of this family is a single unbounded
real variable that is related to the Hessian of the associated quadratic penalty. Its manipulation ul-
timately allows a quadratic state penalty to be selected in a state dependent fashion, in lieu of the
general convex barrier penalty, as the underlying state trajectory evolves in time. Where necessary,
an infinite state penalty corresponding to activation of the state constraint can be levied by allowing
this quadratic penalty parameter to tend to infinity. An approximate sup-of-quadratics representation
follows by limiting the parameter involved to a bounded interval. This approximation exactly repre-
sents the barrier function for states inside a ball, and approximates it by a single quadratic function
for states outside that ball. It is parameterized by the upper bound of the interval involved, and
converges to the exact sup-of-quadratics representation as this upper interval bound tends to infinity.
Examples of the type of sup-of-quadratics representation obtained are illustrated in Figure 1.
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(a) Convex barrier, see Theorem 3.2 and Section 6.
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(b) Semiconvex barrier, see Remark 3.3.
Figure 1: Sup-of-quadratics representation for Φ of (6), (93).
Invocation of the exact or approximate sup-of-quadratics representation for the convex barrier
function in the state constrained regulator problem of interest yields respectively the same regulator
problem, or a convergent approximation to it. Convergence is demonstrated both in terms of the value
functions involved, and the behaviour of their optimal state trajectories. It is shown explicitly that the
exact representation yields an implementation of the state constraint, with trajectories always confined
to the closed ball of interest, and to its interior almost always (a.e. in time). The approximate problem
is shown to yield trajectories that converge to this behaviour. Measurable selection subsequently
leads to the consideration of corresponding two player games. In these games, the minimizing player
corresponds to the usual control, while the maximizing player is an adversary that negotiates an
appropriate state penalty, given the current state of the trajectory relative to the state constraint.
It is shown that the upper values of the exact and approximate games are equivalent respectively
to the exact and approximate regulator problems indicated above, in the same quantitative manner
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regarding value and constraint satisfaction. The upper and lower values are subsequently shown to be
equivalent, see also [5], which is useful in computation. Consideration of the approximating game lower
value yields corresponding state feedback characterizations for the optimal policies of both players.
These policies are shown to explicitly depend on the solution of the state dynamics driven by the
approximate optimal control, and the solution of an attendant family of DREs. It is demonstrated
that solutions of these DREs always exist, and that they encode the actions of the maximizing (state
penalty negotiating) player. Convergence of these policies to those of the exact game is guaranteed,
so that the optimal control in particular converges to that of the original state constrained regulator
problem of interest. An illustrative example is included that evaluates an approximate optimal strategy
for both players, given a specific initial plant state and terminal cost. The effect of the state constraint
on the optimal control and trajectory is also identified.
A selected collection of immediately relevant prior works that invoke duality in optimal control,
and the implementation of constraints in otherwise linear quadratic regulator problems, include [6,
7, 8, 9, 10, 11], and (from the authors) [12, 13, 14]. Specifically, [6] develops an approximation
scheme for general convex costs, and studies consistency of this approximation, while [7] considers
continuous time constrained control in a model predictive control setting, subject to an interiority
condition on the feedback policy. One of many related investigations exploiting barrier functions in
the implementation of constraints is detailed in [11], via a discrete time setting. Duality and saddle
point properties are explored in a more general setting in [8, 10], albeit in the restricted case of
control constraints. The tools of convex analysis are employed in the general treatment of a closely
related class of continuous time problems in [9] that addresses both control and state constraints.
Motivated by [5], a key contribution of the current work relative to [9] concerns the sup-of-quadratics
representation developed for the extended real barrier functions involved, and their invocation in
studying the optimal control problem via an unconstrained game. Preliminary efforts [12, 13, 14] (by
the authors) document the genesis of this contribution, with log-barrier functions considered initially,
and more general convex barrier functions considered subsequently. The more recent work [14] has
demonstrated how this approach can be generalized to more general convex state constraints, in the
company of time-varying dynamics. For brevity, those details are not included here.
In terms of organization, the state constrained linear regulator problem of interest is posed in
Section 2, along with the class of convex barrier functions involved. This is followed in Section 3 by
development of the exact and approximate sup-of-quadratics representations for these convex barrier
functions, and the introduction of the approximate regulator problem. Existence and uniqueness
of optimal trajectories for the exact and approximate regulator problems are considered in Section
4, along with their behaviour relative to the state constraint of interest. Exact and approximate
two player games are formulated in Section 5, and their respective equivalences with the exact and
approximate regulator problems is demonstrated. A further equivalence of the upper and lower values
is demonstrated in each case. This in turn motivates characterization of the optimal policies involved
via solution of a two-point boundary value problem defined in terms of a DRE. This characterization is
subsequently illustrated by example of Section 6. The paper concludes with some minor summarizing
remarks in Section 7. An appendix is included for technicalities that might otherwise interrupt the
developments described.
Throughout, R, N, Z denote the reals, natural numbers, and integers, while R≥0, R>0, and R denote
the non-negative, positive, and extended reals respectively, with the latter defined by R
.
= R
− ∪ R+,
R
± .
= R ∪ {±∞}. For convenience, R≥a .= [a,∞) and R>a .= (a,∞) for any a ∈ R. An n-dimensional
Euclidean space is denoted by Rn. The space of matrices mapping Rm to Rn is denoted by Rn×m.
The subset of positive semidefinite symmetric matrices in Rn×n is denoted by Σn. The Euclidean and
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induced matrix norms are denoted by | · | and ‖ · ‖ respectively. Otherwise, the norm on a Banach
space U is denoted by ‖ · ‖U , or simply ‖ · ‖ if the space is contextually apparent. Open and closed
balls of radius r ∈ R≥0 in U are denoted respectively by BU (0; r) and BU [0; r] respectively. Weak
convergence of a sequence {uk}k∈N ⊂ U to some u¯ ∈ U is denoted by uk ⇀ u¯ (as k → ∞). The
product space U × · · · × U of k ∈ N instances of U is denoted by U k. The space of bounded
linear operators between Banach spaces U and V is denoted by L(U ;V ). The respective spaces of
continuous and k-times continuously differentiable functions mapping U to V are denoted by C(U ;V )
and Ck(U ;V ) for k ∈ N ∪ {∞}. Differentiability at a closed left or right end-point of an interval is
interpreted throughout to mean right- or left-differentiability respectively. The space of (Lebesgue)
square integrable mappings from [0, t] ⊂ R≥0 to U is denoted by L2([0, t];U ). Unless otherwise
specified, C([0, t];U ) is equipped with the sup norm, i.e. ‖F‖ .= ‖F‖C([0,t];U ) .= sups∈[0,t] ‖F (s)‖U ,
F ∈ C([0, t];U ). The following concern a function f : U → R on Banach space U :
f : U → R has (possibly empty) domain dom f .= {u ∈ U | f(u) <∞}.
f : U → R is proper if dom f 6= ∅ and f is finite on dom f , i.e. f(u) > −∞ for all u ∈ dom f .
f : U → R is lower semicontinuous if lsc f(u) .= lim inf u˜→u f(u˜) ≥ f(u) for all u ∈ U .
f : U → R is (lower) closed if f = cl f , see [15, (3.8), p.15], where
cl f(u)
.
=
{
lsc f(u), ∀ u ∈ U if lsc f(u) > −∞ ∀ u ∈ U ,
−∞, ∀ u ∈ U if ∃ u¯ ∈ U s.t. lsc f(u¯) = −∞.
f : U → R is coercive if lim‖u‖→∞ f(u)/‖u‖ =∞.
f : U → R is (strictly) convex if f : dom f → R− is (strictly) convex, i.e. f((1 − λ)u + λu˜) ≤
(1− λ)f(u) + λf(u˜) (strictly) for all λ ∈ (0, 1), u, u˜ ∈ dom f . The map u 7→ ∞ is strictly convex.
2 State constrained linear regulator problem
Interest is restricted to optimal control problems defined on a finite time horizon t ∈ R≥0, with respect
to linear dynamics and a convex barrier state constraint. The value function W t : R
n → R+ involved
is defined by
W t(x)
.
= inf
u∈U [0,t]
J¯t(x, u) , (1)
for all x ∈ Rn, in which U [0, t] .= L2([0, t];Rm) is the space of open loop controls, and J¯t is a cost
function defined with respect to the integrated running costs I¯t and I
κ
t , κ ∈ R>0, and a terminal cost
Ψ. In particular, J¯t, I¯t : R
n ×U [0, t]→ R+, Iκt : U [0, t]→ R≥0, and Ψ : Rn → R≥0, are defined by
J¯t(x, u)
.
= I¯t(x, u) + I
κ
t (u) + Ψ(xt) , (2)
I¯t(x, u)
.
=
∫ t
0
K
2 |ξs|2 + 12 Φ(|ξs|2) ds , It(u)
.
= Iκt (u)
.
= κ2 ‖u‖2U [0,t] , (3)
Ψ(x)
.
= 12 〈x− z, Pt (x− z)〉 , (4)
for all x ∈ Rn, u ∈ U [0, t], in which K ∈ R and Pt ∈ Σn are a priori fixed, and Φ is an extended real
valued barrier function to be specified below. The map s 7→ ξs ∈ Rn, s ∈ [0, t], describes the unique
trajectory of a linear dynamical system corresponding to an initial state x ∈ Rn and input u ∈ U [0, t],
given explicitly via a map χ : Rn ×U [0, t]→ Rn, where
ξs = [χ(x, u)]s
.
= eAs x+
∫ s
0
eA (s−σ)B uσ dσ , (5)
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for all s ∈ [0, t], given A ∈ Rn×n, B ∈ Rn×m, B 6= 0. The barrier function Φ : R→ R+ is defined by
Φ(ρ)
.
=
{
φ(ρ) , ρ ∈ [0, b2),
+∞ , ρ 6∈ [0, b2), (6)
for fixed b ∈ R>0, in which φ : [0, b2)→ R satisfies the following properties:
(i) φ is twice continuously differentiable, with φ′′ strictly positive;
(ii) limρ↑b2 φ(ρ) =∞, and φ′(0) ≥ −K;
(iii) φ is strictly convex;
(iv) φ′ is strictly increasing, and φ′ : [0, b2)→ [φ′(0),∞); and
(v) (φ′)−1 exists, is strictly increasing, and (φ′)−1 : [φ′(0),∞)→ [0, b2).
(7)
Note in particular that (iii)–(v) follow as a consequence of (i)–(ii), see for example [16, Theorem 2.13,
p.46]. As a consequence, φ has a well-defined convex dual a : R≥φ′(0) → R≥−φ(0) given by
a(β)
.
= β (φ′)−1(β)− φ ◦ (φ′)−1(β) , (8)
for all β ∈ R≥φ′(0), that satisfies a variety of properties, including invertibility, etc, see Lemma A.1 in
Appendix A. It defines a useful change of coordinates in the sup-of-quadratics representation that is
developed for barrier Φ in Section 3. Two preliminary lemmas concerning (1), (5) are included prior
to commencing this development. Their proofs are standard and are omitted for brevity.
Lemma 2.1. Given any t ∈ R≥0, x ∈ Rn, U ∈ R≥0, {uk}k∈N ⊂ BU [0,t][0;U ], with ξk .= χ(x, uk)
defined via (5) for all k ∈ N, the following properties hold:
(i) ξ
.
= χ(x, u) : [0, t]→ Rn is uniformly continuous, given any fixed u ∈ U [0, t];
(ii) χ(x, ·) ∈ C∞(U [0, t];C([0, t];Rn)), with kth-order Fre`chet derivatives given for k ∈ N by
Dku χ(x, ·) : U [0, t]→ L((U [0, t])k;C([0, t];Rn)),
[Du χ(x, u)h]s = [Ah]s .=
∫ s
0
eA (s−σ)B hσ dσ , D
k
u χ(x, u) = 0, k ∈ N≥2 ,
(9)
for all u, h ∈ U [0, t], s ∈ [0, t], in which 0 ∈ L((U [0, t])k ;C([0, t];Rn)) denotes the zero operator.
Moreover, A ∈ L(U [0, t];C([0, t];Rn)), with ‖Ah‖C([0,t];Rn) ≤ sups∈[0,t] ‖eA sB‖
√
t ‖h‖U [0,t] for
all h ∈ U [0, t]; and
(iii) {ξk}k∈N ⊂ C([0, t];Rn) is uniformly equicontinuous and uniformly bounded. Furthermore, there
exists a u¯ ∈ U [0, t] and subsequences {vk}k∈N ⊂ {uk}k∈N and {yk}k∈N ⊂ {ξk}k∈N such that
vk ⇀ u¯ weakly and yk → ξ¯ .= χ(x, u¯) uniformly, in which yk = χ(x, vk) for all k ∈ N.
Lemma 2.2. 0 ∈ domW t for all t ∈ R≥0.
3 Barrier representations and an approximate regulator problem
Exact and approximate sup-of-quadratics representations for closed convex barrier functions of the
form of Φ of (6) can be established via convex duality [16, 15]. These representations are fundamental
to the development of a convergent approximation for the state constrained regulator problem (1),
and its subsequent representation via unconstrained linear quadratic games. The development of these
representations and the approximate regulator problem follow below.
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3.1 Exact sup-of-quadratics representation for convex barriers
Lemma 3.1. The barrier function Φ : R → R+ of (6) is closed and convex, and there exists a closed
and convex function Θ : R→ R such that
Φ(ρ) = sup
β∈R
{β ρ−Θ(β)} , Θ(β) = sup
ρ∈R
{β ρ− Φ(ρ)} =
{ −φ(0), β ∈ R<φ′(0),
a(β), β ∈ R≥φ′(0), (10)
for all ρ, β ∈ R, with a as per (8). Furthermore, the optimizers βˆ∗ : R → R and ρˆ∗ : R → R in (10),
defined by βˆ∗(ρ)
.
= argmaxβ∈R{β ρ−Θ(β)} and ρˆ∗(β) .= argmaxρ∈R{β ρ− Φ(ρ)}, are given by
βˆ∗(ρ) =

−∞, ρ ∈ R<0,
φ′(ρ), ρ ∈ [0, b2) ,
+∞, ρ ∈ R≥b2 ,
ρˆ∗(β) =
{
0, β ∈ R<φ′(0),
(φ′)−1(β), β ∈ R≥φ′(0), (11)
for all β, ρ ∈ R.
Proof. See Appendix B.
This lemma, and a change of coordinates via (8), yields the sup-of-quadratics representation.
Theorem 3.2. The barrier function Φ(| · |2) : Rn → R+ appearing in (1) via (2), (3), and defined by
(6), has the exact sup-of-quadratics representation
Φ(|x|2) = sup
α≥−φ(0)
{a−1(α) |x|2 − α} (12)
for all x ∈ Rn, in which a−1 is defined via (8). Furthermore, the optimizer αˆ∗(| · |2) : Rn → R+≥−φ(0)
in (12) is defined via φ′, a of (7), (8) by
αˆ∗(|x|2) = argmax
α≥−φ(0)
{a−1(α) |x|2 − α} =
{
a ◦ φ′(|x|2) , |x| < b ,
∞ , |x| ≥ b , (13)
for all x ∈ Rn.
Proof. Fix arbitrary x ∈ Rn. Recall by Lemma 3.1 that Φ(|x|2) has the representation (10), with
the optimizer βˆ∗(|x|2) that achieves the supremum over β ∈ R there defined by (11). As |x|2 ∈ R≥0,
(11) implies by inspection that βˆ∗(|x|2) ≥ φ′(|x|2). Furthermore, by property (iv) of (7), φ′(|x|2) ≥
φ′(0). Hence, βˆ∗(|x|2) ≥ φ′(0). Meanwhile, a of (8) defines the change of variable α = a(β) for all
β ∈ [φ′(0),∞). Note in particular that φ′(0) = a−1(−φ(0)), as a ◦ φ′(0) = −φ(0) and a is invertible,
see (8) and Lemma A.1. Hence, Φ(|x|2) simplifies from the left-hand equation in (10), via (8), to
Φ(|x|2) = supβ≥φ′(0){β |x|2 − Θ(β)} = supβ≥a−1(−φ(0)){β |x|2 − a(β)}, which yields (12). The same
change of variable applied to βˆ∗(|x|2) via (11) similarly yields (13).
Remark 3.3. While the barrier map ρ 7→ Φ(ρ) : R → R+ of (6) is guaranteed to be convex by
Lemma 3.1, the corresponding state space map x 7→ Φ(|x|2) : Rn → R+ need not be convex. However,
Theorem 3.2 implies that x 7→ Φ(|x|2) : Rn → R+ is uniformly semiconvex [4, 17]. In particular,
choosing any η ≥ −2 a−1(−φ(0)), (12) yields
Φ(|x|2) + η2 |x|2 = sup
α≥−φ(0)
{
[a−1(α) + η2 ] |x|2 − α
}
, (14)
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for all x ∈ Rn, in which a−1(α) + η2 ≥ a−1(α) − a−1(−φ(0)) ≥ 0 for all α ≥ −φ(0), as a−1 is strictly
increasing by Lemma A.1. The right-hand side of (14) is thus a supremum of convex functions, which
is therefore also convex, see [15, p.7]. That is, (14) implies that there exists an η ∈ R such that
Φ(| · |2) + η2 | · |2 is convex, so that Φ(| · |2) is uniformly semiconvex by definition, see [4, 17].
3.2 Approximate sup-of-quadratics representation for convex barriers
An approximation of the sup-of-quadratics representation of Theorem 3.2 can be obtained by restrict-
ing the interval over which the supremum is evaluated in the left-hand equation in (10). To this end,
define ΦM : R→ R+ and ρˆ : [−φ(0),∞)→ [0, b2) by
ΦM(ρ)
.
= sup
β≤a−1(M)
{β ρ−Θ(β)} , ρˆ(M) .= (φ′)−1 ◦ a−1(M), (15)
for all M ∈ R≥−φ(0), ρ ∈ R, with φ′, a, Θ as per (7), (8), (10), with the range of ΦM to be verified.
Lemma 3.4. The following properties hold:
(i) ΦM : R→ R+, M ∈ R≥−φ(0), of (15) satisfies
ΦM (ρ) =

∞, ρ ∈ R<0,
φ(ρ), ρ ∈ [0, ρˆ(M)],
a−1(M) ρ−M, ρ ∈ R>ρˆ(M),
(16)
for all ρ ∈ R, in which the corresponding maximizer β = βM∗ : R→ R− is given by
βˆM∗(ρ)
.
=

−∞, ρ ∈ R<0,
φ′(ρ), ρ ∈ [0, ρˆ(M)],
a−1(M), ρ ∈ R>ρˆ(M).
(17)
(ii) ΦM ∈ C(R≥0;R) ∩ C1(R>0;R), M ∈ R≥−φ(0), and it is closed and strictly convex on R;
(iii) ΦM is pointwise non-decreasing in M ∈ R≥−φ(0), and satisfies Φ(ρ) = supM≥−φ(0)ΦM (ρ) =
limM→∞Φ
M(ρ), for all ρ ∈ R, with Φ as per (6);
(iv) There exists an M1 ∈ R≥−φ(0) and c ∈ R such that infM≥M1 infρ∈R ΦM(ρ) > c.
Proof. See Appendix B.
As per the exact case of Theorem 3.2, application of this lemma along with a change of coordinates
defined by (8) admits the required approximate sup-of-quadratics representation.
Theorem 3.5. Given b ∈ R>0, the following holds:
(i) Given M ∈ R≥−φ(0), the convex approximation ΦM of the convex barrier function Φ of (6),
represented in (15), (16), has the sup-of-quadratics representation
ΦM (|x|2) = sup
α∈[−φ(0),M ]
{a−1(α) |x|2 − α} (18)
for all x ∈ Rn, in which a−1 is as per (8). Furthermore, the optimizer in (18) is
αˆM∗(|x|2) .= argmax
α∈[−φ(0),M ]
{a−1(α) |x|2 − α} =
{
a ◦ φ′(|x|2) , |x|2 ≤ ρˆ(M) ,
M , |x|2 > ρˆ(M) , (19)
where φ′, a, ρˆ are as per (7), (8), (15); and
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(ii) ΦM (| · |2) : Rn → R defined by (18) is pointwise non-decreasing in M ∈ R≥−φ(0), and converges
pointwise to Φ(| · |2) : Rn → R+ of (12) in the limit as M →∞.
Proof. (i) Fix M ∈ R≥−φ(0), x ∈ Rn. Applying Lemma 3.4 (i), note that the optimizer (17) in
(15) satisfies βˆM∗(|x|2) ∈ [φ′(0), a−1(M)], as |x|2 ∈ R≥0. Meanwhile, a of (8) defines a change of
variable α = a(β) for all β ∈ [φ′(0),∞), via Lemma A.1. Hence, ΦM (|x|2) transforms from (15) to
ΦM (|x|2) = supβ∈[φ′(0),a−1(M)]{β |x|2 −Θ(β)} = supβ∈[a−1(−φ(0)),a−1(M)]{β |x|2 − a(β)} via (10), which
yields (18). The same change of variable applied to βˆM∗(|x|2) of (17) yields (19).
(ii) Immediate by Lemma 3.4 (iii).
Corollary 3.6. Given K ∈ R≥−φ′(0) as per (3), (7),
ΦM (ρ) ≥ φ′(0) ρ + φ(0), K ρ+ΦM (ρ) ≥ [K + φ′(0)] ρ + φ(0) ≥ φ(0),
Φ(ρ) ≥ φ′(0) ρ + φ(0), K ρ+Φ(ρ) ≥ φ(0), (20)
for all M ∈ R≥−φ(0), ρ ∈ R≥0.
Proof. Fix M ∈ R≥−φ(0), ρ ∈ R≥0. Applying Theorem 3.5 (i), α .= −φ(0) is suboptimal in the
right-hand side of (18), so that ΦM(ρ) ≥ a−1(−φ(0)) ρ + φ(0) = φ′(0) ρ + φ(0) and K ρ + ΦM(ρ) ≥
[K + φ′(0)] ρ + φ(0) ≥ φ(0), by (8) and (7). As ΦM(ρ) is non-decreasing in M by Theorem 3.5 (ii),
the same inequalities hold with M →∞.
3.3 Approximate regulator problem and its convergence to the exact problem
The sup-of-quadratics representation (12) for the convex barrier function Φ of (6), and its convergent
approximation (18), can be used to formulate an approximate regulator problem for (1). Given
t ∈ R≥0, M ∈ R≥−φ(0), the value function WMt : Rn → R for this approximate problem is defined by
W
M
t (x)
.
= inf
u∈U [0,t]
J¯Mt (x, u) (21)
for all x ∈ Rn, with J¯Mt : Rn × U [0, t] → R defined with respect to Iκt and Ψ of (3), (4) and
I¯Mt : R
n ×U [0, t]→ R by
J¯Mt (x, u)
.
= I¯Mt (x, u) + I
κ
t (u) + Ψ(ξt), (22)
I¯Mt (x, u)
.
=
∫ t
0
K
2 |ξs|2 + 12 ΦM (|ξs|2) ds, (23)
for all x ∈ Rn, u ∈ U [0, t], in which ξ .= χ(x, u) and ΦM are as per (5) and (15), (16), (18) respectively,
and K ∈ R≥−φ′(0), κ ∈ R>0 are fixed. This approximate problem recovers the original problem of (1)
in the limit asM →∞, as formalized by the theorem below. For convenience, J¯∞t : Rn×U [0, t]→ R+
and W
∞
t : R
n → R+ are defined by
J¯∞t (x, u)
.
= sup
M∈R≥−φ(0)
J¯Mt (x, u) (24)
W
∞
t (x)
.
= sup
M∈R≥−φ(0)
W
M
t (x) (25)
for all x ∈ Rn, u ∈ U [0, t].
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Theorem 3.7. Given t ∈ R≥0, the cost and value functions J¯Mt , WMt of (22), (21) are pointwise
non-decreasing in M ∈ R≥−φ(0), and satisfy
−∞ < J¯Mt (x, u) ≤ J¯∞t (x, u) = lim
M→∞
J¯Mt (x, u) = J¯t(x, u), (26)
−∞ < WMt (x) ≤W∞t (x) = lim
M→∞
W
M
t (x) =W t(x), R
n = domW
M
t ⊃ domW t 6= ∅ , (27)
for all x ∈ Rn, u ∈ U [0, t]. where J¯t, J¯∞t : Rn ×U [0, t] → R+ and W t, W∞t : Rn → R+ are defined
by (1), (2) and (24), (25).
Proof. Fix t ∈ R≥0, x ∈ Rn. [Non-decreasing property] This is immediate by inspection of (21), (22),
(23), and the non-decreasing property of ΦM(| · |2) provided by Theorem 3.5 (ii).
[Left-hand inequalities in (26), (27)] Immediate by the definition of J¯∞t , W
∞
t in (24), (25). Also,
Corollary 3.6 implies that −∞ < φ(0)2 t ≤ J¯Mt (x, u). Moreover, as u is arbitrary here, −∞ < φ(0)2 t ≤
W
M
t (x) = infu∈U [0,t] J¯
M
t (x.u).
[Domain properties in (27)] Fix M ∈ R≥−φ(0). It is immediate by the left-hand inequality in
(27) and Lemma 2.2 that domW
M
t ⊃ domW t 6= ∅ holds. For the remaining assertion, fix u ∈
U [0, t], and recall that χ(x, u) ∈ C([0, t];Rn) via (5) and Lemma 2.1. Applying Lemma 3.4 (ii),
ΦM (|χ(x, u)|2) ∈ C([0, t];R), so that J¯Mt (x, u) < ∞ by inspection of (22). Hence, as u is arbitrary,
W
M
t (x) = infu∈U [0,t] J¯
M
t (x.u) <∞, and as x ∈ Rn is arbitrary, domWMt = Rn.
[Limits in (26), (27)] Immediate from the non-decreasing property above.
[Right-hand equality in (26)] Fix u ∈ U [0, t]. In view of Corollary 3.6 and (23), it follows that
I¯Mt (x, u) =
∫ t
0 ν
M
s ds+
φ(0)
2 t, where s 7→ νMs
.
= K2 |ξs|2+ 12 ΦM(|ξs|2)− φ(0)2 is nonnegative by Corollary
3.6, non-decreasing in M ∈ R≥−φ(0) by Theorem 3.5 (ii), and continuous (and hence measurable).
Applying the monotone convergence theorem,
sup
M>−φ(0)
I¯Mt (x, u) = lim
M→∞
∫ t
0
νMs ds+
φ(0)
2 t
=
∫ t
0
lim
M→∞
νMs ds+
φ(0)
2 t =
∫ t
0
K
2 |ξs|2 + 12 limM→∞Φ
M (|ξs|2) ds = I¯t(x, u),
in which final equality follows by Lemma 3.4 (iii). Hence, recalling (22), (24),
J¯∞t (x, u) = sup
M∈R≥−φ(0)
I¯Mt (x, u) + I
κ
t (u) + Ψ(ξt) = I¯t(x, u) + I
κ
t (u) + Ψ(ξt) = J¯t(x, u) ,
in which it is noted that x ∈ Rn and u ∈ U [0, t] are arbitrary.
[Right-hand equality in (27)] Applying (24), (25), (26),
W
∞
t (x) = sup
M≥−φ(0)
inf
u∈U [0,t]
J¯Mt (x, u) ≤ inf
u∈U [0,t]
sup
M≥−φ(0)
J¯Mt (x, u) = inf
u∈U [0,t]
J¯t(x, u) =W t(x) . (28)
It remains to demonstrate the opposite inequality. To this end, fix an arbitrary ǫ ∈ R>0, and select
any non-decreasing sequence {Mk}k∈N ⊂ R≥−φ(0) such that limk→∞Mk = ∞. Define a sequence
{uǫk}k∈N ⊂ U [0, t] by
J¯Mkt (x, u
ǫ
k) < W
Mk
t (x) + ǫ, (29)
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and note by definition (21) ofW
Mk
t (x) that this is always possible. Suppose that {uǫk}k∈N is unbounded.
Applying Corollary 3.6 in the definition (23) of I¯Mkt (x, ·), note that I¯Mkt (x, u) ≥ φ(0)2 t for all u ∈ U [0, t].
Combining this bound with (22) and (29) yields
W
∞
t (x) = lim
k→∞
W
Mk
t (x) ≥ lim
k→∞
J¯Mkt (x, u
ǫ
k)− ǫ ≥ φ(0)2 t− ǫ+ κ2 limk→∞ ‖u
ǫ
k‖2U [0,t] =∞,
which yields W
∞
t (x) ≥W t(x), as required to complete the proof in that unbounded case.
Alternatively, suppose that {uǫk}k∈N is bounded, i.e. there exists U ∈ R≥0 such that {uǫk}k∈N ∈
BU [0,t][0;U ]. Lemma 2.1 (iii) implies that there exists a subsequence {u˜ǫk}k∈N ⊂ {uǫk}k∈N such that
ξ˜ǫk → ξ¯ǫ uniformly as k → ∞, where ξ˜ǫk
.
= χ(x, u˜ǫk). In view of (3), (23), and Corollary 3.6, define a
sequence {ν˜ǫk}k∈N of maps from [0, t] to R≥0, and its candidate limit ν¯ǫ : [0, t]→ R
+
≥0, by
[ν˜ǫk]s
.
= K2 |[ξ˜ǫk]s|2 + 12 ΦMk(|[ξ˜ǫk]s|2)− φ(0)2 , ν¯ǫs
.
= K2 |[ξ¯ǫ]s|2 + 12 Φ(|[ξ¯ǫ]s|2)− φ(0)2 , (30)
for all s ∈ [0, t], k ∈ N. Fix any s ∈ [0, t], j ∈ N. Note that by monotonicity of {ΦMk}k∈N, see
Lemma 3.4 (iii) or Theorem 3.5 (ii), ΦMk(|[ξ˜ǫk]s|2) = [ΦMk(|[ξ˜ǫk]s|2) − ΦMj(|[ξ˜ǫk]s|2)] + ΦMj(|[ξ˜ǫk]s|2) ≥
ΦMj(|[ξ˜ǫk]s|2) for all k ≥ j. Hence, as ΦMj is continuous, lim infk→∞ΦMk(|[ξ˜ǫk]s|2) ≥ ΦMj (|ξ¯ǫs|2), so
that lim infk→∞Φ
Mk(|[ξ˜ǫk]s|2) ≥ limj→∞ΦMj(|ξ¯ǫs|2) = Φ(|ξ¯ǫs|2). As limk→∞ |[ξ˜ǫk]s|2 = |[ξ¯ǫ]s|2, (30)
subsequently yields that
ν¯ǫs ≤ lim inf
k→∞
[ν˜ǫk]s . (31)
By inspection, ν¯ǫs =∞ implies that limk→∞[ν˜ǫk]s =∞ = ν¯ǫs.
Alternatively, suppose that ν¯ǫs <∞. In view of (30), define [νˆǫk]s
.
= K2 |[ξ˜ǫk]s|2 + 12 Φ(|[ξ˜ǫk]s|2)− φ(0)2
for all k ∈ N. As ν¯ǫs <∞, there exists an open interval containing |ξ¯ǫs|2 on which Φ is continuous, and
limk→∞[ξ˜
ǫ
k]s = [ξ¯
ǫ]s, so that [νˆ
ǫ
k]s < ∞ for all k ∈ N sufficiently large, and limk→∞[νˆǫk]s = ν¯ǫs. Note
further that [ν˜ǫk]s ≤ [νˆǫk]s for all k ∈ N, again by Lemma 3.4 (iii). Hence,
lim sup
k→∞
[ν˜ǫk]s ≤ lim sup
k→∞
[νˆǫk]s = ν¯
ǫ
s . (32)
Consequently, combining (31) and (32), and recalling the ν¯ǫs = ∞ case above, it may be concluded
that limk→∞[ν˜
ǫ
k]s = ν¯
ǫ
s for both the ν¯
ǫ
s =∞ and the ν¯ǫs <∞ cases.
Next, recall by definition (30) and Corollary 3.6, that {v˜ǫk}k∈N defines a non-negative sequence of
functions in C([0, t];R). Consequently, every element of this sequence is measurable and non-negative,
so that Fatou’s lemma yields
∫ t
0 ν¯
ǫ
s ds =
∫ t
0 lim infk→∞[ν˜
ǫ
k]s ≤ lim infk→∞
∫ t
0 [ν˜
ǫ
k]s ds. Hence, recalling
(30), the definitions of ξ˜ǫk, ξ¯
ǫ prior, and (3), (23),
I¯t(x, u¯
ǫ) =
∫ t
0
K
2 |ξ¯ǫs|2 + 12 Φ(|ξ¯ǫs|2) ds =
∫ t
0
ν¯ǫs ds +
φ(0)
2 t (33)
≤ lim inf
k→∞
∫ t
0
[ν˜ǫk]s ds+
φ(0)
2 t = lim infk→∞
∫ t
0
K
2 |[ξ˜ǫk]s|2 + 12 ΦMk(|[ξ˜ǫk]s|2) ds = lim infk→∞ I¯
Mk
t (x, u˜
ǫ
k) .
Meanwhile, by weak convergence of u˜ǫk to u¯
ǫ, ‖u¯ǫ‖U [0,t] ≤ lim infk→∞ ‖u˜ǫk‖U [0,t], so that (3) implies
Iκt (u¯
ǫ) = κ2‖u¯ǫ‖2U [0,t] ≤ lim infk→∞
κ
2 ‖u˜ǫk‖2U [0,t] = lim infk→∞ I
κ
t (u˜
ǫ
k) . (34)
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Moreover, continuity of [χ(x, ·)]t by Lemma 2.1 (ii), along with continuity of Ψt of (4), imply that
Ψt(ξ¯
ǫ
t ) = lim
k→∞
Ψt([ξ˜
ǫ
k]t) . (35)
Combining (33), (34), (35) via (2), (22) yields
J¯t(x, u¯
ǫ) = I¯t(x, u¯
ǫ) + Iκt (u¯
ǫ) + Ψt(ξ¯
ǫ
t ) ≤ lim inf
k→∞
I¯Mkt (x, u˜
ǫ
k) + lim inf
k→∞
Iκt (u˜
ǫ
k) + lim
k→∞
Ψt([ξ˜
ǫ
k]t)
≤ lim inf
k→∞
{
I¯Mkt (x, u˜
ǫ
k) + I
κ
t (u˜
ǫ
k) + Ψt([ξ˜
ǫ
k]t)
}
= lim inf
k→∞
J¯Mkt (x, u˜
ǫ
k). (36)
Hence, applying (29) and (36) while recalling that {u˜ǫk}k∈N ⊂ {uǫk}k∈N is a subsequence of the near-
optimal inputs involved, and noting that u¯ǫ is suboptimal in the definition (1) of W t(x), yields
W t(x) ≤ J¯t(x, u¯ǫ) ≤ lim inf
k→∞
J¯Mkt (x, u˜
ǫ
k) ≤ lim inf
k→∞
W
Mk
t (x) + ǫ =W
∞
(x) + ǫ .
As ǫ ∈ R>0 is arbitrary, it follows that W t(x) ≤ W∞(x). Recalling (28) and the fact that t ∈ R≥0
and x ∈ Rn are also arbitrary completes the proof of the equality in (27).
4 Optimal trajectories and constraint satisfaction
Existence and uniqueness of the optimal trajectories in (1), (21) is demonstrated via analysis of the
attendant cost functions (2), (23). In particular, these cost functions are shown to be proper, lower
semicontinuous, strictly convex, and coercive. These properties are demonstrated to be sufficient for
the required existence and uniqueness of the optimal controls involved, and hence the corresponding
trajectories. The behaviour of these optimal trajectories relative to the desired state constraint is
subsequently determined.
4.1 Existence and uniqueness of the optimal controls
In order to demonstrate that the cost functions J¯t(x, ·), J¯Mt (x, ·) : U [0, t] → R+ of (2), (23) are
proper, convex, and coercive for fixed t ∈ R≥0, M ∈ R≥−φ(0), x ∈ Rn, it is useful to consider the map
γs,αx : U [0, t]→ R defined for fixed x ∈ Rn, s ∈ [0, t], α ∈ R≥−φ(0) by
γs,αx (u)
.
= 12 [K + a
−1(α)] |[χ(x, u)]s |2 − α2 (37)
for all u ∈ U [0, t], in which χ is as per (5).
Lemma 4.1. Given t ∈ R≥0, x ∈ Rn, s ∈ [0, t], α ∈ R≥−φ(0), γs,αx : U [0, t]→ R of (37) is convex.
Proof. Fix t ∈ R≥0, x ∈ Rn, s ∈ [0, t], α ∈ R≥−φ(0). As u 7→ [χ(x, u)]s is affine by (5), convexity of
γs,αx follows by inspection of (37), properties (ii) and (iii) of (7), and Lemma A.1.
Lemma 4.2. Given any t ∈ R>0, M ∈ R≥−φ(0), the cost functions J¯t(x, ·), J¯Mt (x, ·) : U [0, t] → R+
defined for x ∈ Rn by (2), (23) satisfy the following properties:
(i) J¯Mt (x, ·) and J¯t(x, ·) are respectively continuous and lower semicontinuous for all x ∈ Rn;
(ii) Both are strictly convex and coercive for all x ∈ Rn; and
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(iii) J¯Mt (x, ·) and J¯t(y, ·) are proper for all x ∈ domWMt = Rn and all y ∈ domW t.
Proof. Fix t ∈ R>0, M ∈ R≥−φ(0). (i) Fix x ∈ Rn. [Continuity of J¯Mt (x, ·)] By inspection of (22),
(23), and (3), (4), continuity of J¯Mt (x, ·) on U [0, t] requires continuity of its constituent maps I¯Mt (x, ·),
Iκt , and Ψ([χ(x, ·)]t) on U [0, t]. This is immediate for Iκt and Ψ([χ(x, ·)]t), by (3), (4), and Lemma 2.1
(ii). The same conclusion follows for I¯Mt (x, ·), by application of Lemma 2.1 (ii) and Lemma 3.4 (ii).
[Lower semicontinuity of J¯t(x, ·)] Fix u ∈ U [0, t], and any sequence {u˜i}i∈N ⊂ U [0, t] such that
limi→∞ ‖u− u˜i‖U [0,t] = 0. By continuity of J¯Mt (x, ·), note that J¯Mt (x, u) = limi→∞ J¯Mt (x, u˜i). Hence,
applying Theorem 3.7, and in particular (24), (26),
J¯t(x, u) = sup
M≥−φ(0)
J¯Mt (x, u) = sup
M≥−φ(0)
lim inf
i→∞
J¯Mt (x, u˜i) = sup
M≥−φ(0)
sup
j∈N
inf
i>j
J¯Mt (x, u˜i)
≤ sup
j∈N
inf
i>j
sup
M≥−φ(0)
J¯Mt (x, u˜i) = lim inf
i→∞
sup
M≥−φ(0)
J¯Mt (x, u˜i) = lim inf
i→∞
J¯t(x, u˜i) .
As u ∈ U [0, t] and {u˜i}i∈N ⊂ U [0, t] are arbitrary, the assertion follows.
(ii) Fix x ∈ Rn. [Convexity of J¯Mt (x, ·)] Fix u ∈ U [0, t], and ξ .= χ(x, u) by (5). By (3), (18), (23),
I¯Mt (x, u) =
∫ t
0
K
2 |ξs|2 + 12 ΦM (|ξs|2) ds =
∫ t
0
sup
α∈[−φ(0),M ]
γs,αx (u) ds, (38)
where γs,αx is as per (37). Recall by Lemma 4.1 that γ
s,α
x : U [0, t] → R is convex for any s ∈ [0, t],
α ∈ R≥−φ(0). As convexity is preserved under suprema and integration, see [15, Theorem 3 and (2.6),
p.7], it follows by (38) that I¯Mt (x, ·) : U [0, t] → R is convex. Consequently, as κ ∈ R>0 in (3),
I¯Mt (x, ·) + Iκt (·) : U [0, t]→ R is strictly convex. Lastly, as Ψ of (4) is convex by definition of Pt ∈ Σn,
and [χ(x, ·)]t : U [0, t] → Rn is affine, Ψ([χ(x, ·)]t) : U [0, t] → R is also convex. Hence, applying (22),
J¯Mt (x, ·) : U [0, t]→ R is strictly convex.
[Convexity of J¯t(x, ·)] Recalling the convexity argument immediately above, I¯Mt (x, ·)+Ψ([χ(x, ·)]t) =
J¯Mt (x, ·) − κ2‖ · ‖2U [0,t] : U [0, t] → R is convex for all M ∈ R≥−φ(0). As convexity is preserved under
suprema [15, (2.6), p.7], and Theorem 3.7 implies that (26), (24) hold, convexity of J¯t(x, ·)−κ2 ‖·‖2U [0,t] =
supM≥−φ(0) J¯
M
t (x, ·)− κ2‖ ·‖2U [0,t] : U [0, t]→ R
+
follows. Hence, J¯t(x, ·) is strictly convex, as κ ∈ R>0.
[Coercivity of J¯Mt (x, ·)] Recall by Corollary 3.6 that K2 | · |2+ 12 ΦM (| · |2) ≥ φ(0)2 . Applying (2), (4),
J¯Mt (x, u) =
∫ t
0
K
2 |ξs|2 + 12 ΦM (|ξs|2) ds + κ2 ‖u‖2U [0,t] +Ψ(ξt) ≥ φ(0)2 t+ κ2 ‖u‖2U [0,t], (39)
for all x ∈ Rn, u ∈ U [0, t]. Hence, J¯Mt (x, ·) is coercive, as κ ∈ R>0.
[Coercivity of J¯t(x, ·)] Follows by coercivity of J¯Mt (x, ·) and (26) of Theorem 3.7.
(iii) Lemma 2.2 demonstrates that domW t 6= ∅. Fix any x ∈ domW t. Select a near-optimal input
u˜ ∈ U [0, t] in the definition (1) of W t(x), such that J¯Mt (x, u˜) ≤ J¯t(x, u˜) < W t(x) + 1 <∞, and note
that this is always possible by Theorem 3.7, i.e. (26). Hence, dom J¯Mt (x, ·) 6= ∅ 6= dom J¯t(x, ·). Again
recalling (26), along with (39), note also that −∞ < φ(0)2 t + κ2 ‖u‖2U [0,t] ≤ J¯Mt (x, u) ≤ J¯t(x, u) for
all u ∈ U [0, t]. Hence, J¯t(x, ·), J¯Mt (x, ·) : U [0, t] → R+ of (2), (23) are proper for any x ∈ domW t.
Finally, recalling (39) yields that J¯Mt (y, ·) is also proper for any y ∈ domWMt = Rn.
With t ∈ R>0, existence and uniqueness of the optimal controls in (1), (21) may now be established.
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Theorem 4.3. Given any t ∈ R>0, M ∈ R≥−φ(0), x ∈ domW t, y ∈ domWMt = Rn, there exist
unique optimal controls u∗, uM∗ ∈ U [0, t] for the respective optimal control problems (1), (21), with
u∗ = argmin
u∈U [0,t]
J¯t(x, u), u
M∗ = argmin
u∈U [0,t]
J¯Mt (y, u). (40)
Proof. As the existence and uniqueness arguments for the two optimal controls in (40) are analogous,
only the first is included. Fix any t ∈ R>0, and recall that domW t 6= ∅ by Lemma 2.2. Fix any
x ∈ domW t, and recall by Lemma 4.2 that J¯t(x, ·) : U [0, t] → R+ is proper, lower semicontinuous,
strictly convex, and coercive. Given ℓ ∈ R+, define the level set Λℓ ⊂ U [0, t] by
Λℓ
.
=
{
u ∈ U [0, t] ∣∣ J¯t(x, u) ≤ ℓ} . (41)
As J¯t(x, ·) : U [0, t] → R+ is proper and coercive, and (39) holds, there exists uˆ ∈ U [0, t] such that
−∞ < φ(0)2 t+ κ2 ‖uˆ‖2U [0,t] ≤ J¯t(x, uˆ) <∞. Consequently, ℓ0
.
= infu∈U [0,t] J¯t(x, u) is finite, i.e. ℓ0 ∈ R,
and Λℓ of (41) is guaranteed to be non-empty for all ℓ > ℓ0. Moreover, as κ ∈ R>0, (39) implies that
Λℓ is bounded for all ℓ > ℓ0, with Λℓ ⊂ BU [0,t][0, rℓ], rℓ .= [ℓ − φ(0)2 t]
1
2 (and note by inspection that
ℓ0 ≥ φ(0)2 t). Define a decreasing sequence {ℓk}k∈N ⊂ R such that limk→∞ ℓk = ℓ0, and a corresponding
sequence {uk}k∈N ⊂ U [0, t] such that uk ∈ Λℓk . Note in particular that uk ∈ Λℓ1 ⊂ BU [0,t][0; rℓ1 ]
as Λℓk ⊃ Λℓk+1 6= ∅, for all k ∈ N. That is, {uk}k∈N is bounded. As per the proof of Theorem 3.7,
this implies the existence of a subsequence {uˆk}k∈N ⊂ {uk}k∈N and a u¯ ∈ U [0, t] such that ξˆk → ξ¯
uniformly as k →∞, where ξˆk .= χ(x, uˆk), ξ¯ .= χ(x, u¯). Define a sequence of maps {νˆk}k∈N from [0, t]
to R
+
and its candidate limit ν¯ : [0, t]→ R+ by
[νˆk]s
.
= K2 |[ξˆk]s|2 + 12 Φ(|[ξˆk]s|2)− φ(0)2 , ν¯s
.
= K2 |ξ¯s|2 + 12 Φ(|ξ¯s|2)− φ(0)2 , (42)
for all k ∈ N, s ∈ [0, t]. By inspection, note that limk→∞[νˆk]s = ν¯s, irrespective of finiteness
of ν¯s, for all s ∈ [0, t]. Repeating the Fatou’s Lemma argument of the proof of Theorem 3.7,∫ t
0 ν¯s ds =
∫ t
0 lim infk→∞[νˆk]s ds ≤ lim infk→∞
∫ t
0 [νˆk]s ds. Hence, (3), (42) imply that I¯t(x, u¯) =∫ t
0 ν¯s ds+
φ(0)
2 t ≤ lim infk→∞
∫ t
0 [νˆk]s ds+
φ(0)
2 t = lim infk→∞ I¯t(x, uˆk), which, again following the proof
of Theorem 3.7, yields J¯t(x, u¯) ≤ lim infk→∞ J¯t(x, uˆk). Abuse notation by relabelling {ℓk}k∈N to match
the subsequence {uˆk}k∈N of {uk}k∈N, and note that uˆk ∈ Λℓk . Hence, J¯t(x, u¯) ≤ lim infk→∞ J¯t(x, uˆk) ≤
lim infk→∞ ℓk = ℓ0. Consequently, by definition of ℓ0, J¯t(x, u¯) = ℓ0 = infu∈U [0,t] J¯t(x, u), so that u¯ ∈
argminu∈U [0,t] J¯t(x, u) and the argmin is non-empty. Suppose there exists a u˜ ∈ argminu∈U [0,t] J¯t(x, u)
such that u˜ 6= u¯, and define u˘ .= 12 (u¯ + u˜) ∈ U [0, t]. By strict convexity of J¯t(x, ·), J¯t(x, u˘) <
1
2 J¯t(x, u¯) +
1
2 J¯t(x, u˜) = J¯t(x, u¯), contradicting u¯ ∈ argminu∈U [0,t] J¯t(x, u). Hence, the argmin is a
singleton, with {u∗} = argminu∈U [0,t] J¯t(x, u), as u∗ .= u¯ = u˜.
Remark 4.4. In the t = 0 special case, note by (3) that Iκt : U [0, t]→ R is identically zero, and so is
not strictly convex. Consequently, the strict convexity assertion (ii) of Lemma 4.2 fails in that case,
and uniqueness of the optimal controls in (1), (21) cannot be established via Theorem 4.3.
Remark 4.5. Given any non-decreasing sequence {Mk}k∈N ⊂ R≥−φ(0) such that limk→∞Mk = ∞,
it may be shown that there exists a subsequence {Mj}j∈N ⊂ {Mk}k∈N such that the corresponding
optimal controls {uMj∗}j∈N ⊂ U [0, t] and u∗ ∈ U [0, t] of (40) satisfy uMj∗ ⇀ u∗ in U [0, t], as j →∞.
The details follow a similar argument to the proof of Theorem 4.3 above, and are omitted.
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4.2 Constraint satisfaction
With existence of the optimal controls in (1), (21) guaranteed by Theorem 4.3, the corresponding
state trajectories can be examined to determine their compliance with the intended state constraint.
To this end, given t ∈ R>0, x ∈ Rn, ǫ ∈ R>0, define the sets of ǫ-optimal inputs in the definitions (1),
(21) of W t(x), W
M
t (x), M ∈ R≥−φ(0), respectively by
U
ǫ
x [0, t]
.
=
{
u ∈ U [0, t]
∣∣∣∣W t(x) + ǫ > J¯t(x, u)} , (43)
U
M,ǫ
x [0, t]
.
=
{
u ∈ U [0, t]
∣∣∣∣WMt (x) + ǫ > J¯Mt (x, u)} . (44)
Define the sets of times for which the desired state constraint is violated, as a function of the initial
state and control, via a map ∆t : R
n ×U → ∪I⊂[0,t]I, where
∆t(x, u)
.
=
⋃
r∈[0,t],s∈[r,t]
{
[r, s]
∣∣ |[χ(x, u)]σ | ≥ b ∀ σ ∈ [r, s] } (45)
for all x ∈ Rn, u ∈ U [0, t], in which χ is as per (5).
Theorem 4.6. The following properties concerning the map ∆t of (45) hold for any t ∈ R>0:
(i) There exist constants M1 ∈ R>−φ(0) and ηt, λt, Ξt ∈ R>0 and non-increasing β : R>M1 → R>0
satisfying limM→∞ β(M) = 0, such that for any M ∈ R>M1, ǫ ∈ R>0,
sup
u∈U M,ǫx [0,t]
µ(∆t(x, u)) ≤ β(M)
[
ηt
(
W
M
t (x) + ǫ
)
+ λt + Ξt |x|2
]
(46)
for all x ∈ Rn, in which µ denotes the Lebesgue measure, and U M,ǫx is as per (44);
(ii) Given any x ∈ domW t, and any ǫ ∈ R>0,
lim
M→∞
sup
u∈U M,ǫx [0,t]
µ(∆t(x, u)) = 0 = sup
u∈U ǫx [0,t]
µ(∆t(x, u)) , (47)
in which U ǫx [0, t] is as per (43); and
(iii) Given any x ∈ domW t, and any strictly increasing sequence {Mk}k∈N ⊂ R>−φ(0), there exist a
unique u∗ ∈ U [0, t] and a unique sequence {uMk∗}k∈N ⊂ U [0, t], specified by (40), such that
lim
k→∞
µ(∆t(x, u
Mk∗)) = 0 = µ(∆t(x, u
∗)) .
Proof. Fix any t ∈ R>0. Select M1 ∈ R≥−φ(0), c ∈ R as per Lemma 3.4 (iv). Fix any M ∈ R>M1 . By
definition of M , M1, and c, Lemma 3.4 (iii) and (iv) imply that
c < inf
M≥M1
inf
ρ∈R
ΦM(ρ) ≤ ΦM1(b2) ≤ ΦM(b2) . (48)
Motivated by (48), define β : R>M1 → R>0 by
β(M)
.
=
2
ΦM(b2)− c (49)
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for all M > M1, and note that it is non-increasing by Lemma 3.4 (iii). Furthermore, (18) and Lemma
A.2 imply that limM→∞Φ
M (b2) ≥ limM→∞{a−1(M) b2 −M} = limM→∞ γb2(M) =∞, where γb2(M)
is as per (99). Hence, by inspection of (49), limM→∞ β(M) = 0.
(i) Fix any x ∈ Rn, ǫ ∈ R>0, and u ∈ U M,ǫx [0, t], and denote the corresponding near-optimal tra-
jectory by ξ
.
= χ(x, u) as per (5). Applying (44) and Corollary 3.6, note thatW
M
t (x)+ǫ > J¯
M
t (x, u) ≥∫ t
0
K
2 |ξs|2+ 12 ΦM (|ξs|2) ds+ κ2 ‖u‖2U [0,t] ≥ φ(0)2 t+ κ2 ‖u‖2U [0,t], so that ‖u‖2U [0,t] ≤ 2κ [W
M
t (x)+ǫ− φ(0)2 t].
Recalling (5), there exist Ξt, γ¯t ∈ R>0 such that ‖ξ‖2L2([0;t];Rn) ≤ Ξt |x|2 + γ¯t ‖u‖2U [0,t], so that
‖ξ‖2
L2([0;t];Rn)
≤ Ξt |x|2 + γ¯t ( 2κ) [W
M
t (x) + ǫ− φ(0)2 t] .
Consequently, returning to the definition (44) of near optimality, and applying (45), Corollary 3.6,
and the bound K + φ′(0) ≥ 0 adopted in (7) (ii),
W
M
t (x) + ǫ > J¯
M
t (x, u) ≥
∫ t
0
K
2 |ξs|2 + 12 ΦM(|ξs|2) ds
=
∫
[0,t]\∆t(x,u)
K
2 |ξs|2 + 12 ΦM(|ξs|2) ds +
∫
∆t(x,u)
K
2 |ξs|2 + 12 ΦM(|ξs|2) ds
≥
∫
[0,t]\∆t(x,u)
−φ′(0)2 ds+
∫
∆t(x,u)
−φ′(0)2 |ξs|2 + c2 ds+
∫
∆t(x,u)
K+φ′(0)
2 |ξs|2 + 12 [ΦM (|ξs|2)− c] ds
≥ − |φ′(0)|+|c|2 t− |φ
′(0)|
2 ‖ξ‖2L2([0;t];Rn) +
∫
∆t(x,u)
1
2 [Φ
M (b2)− c] ds
≥ − |φ′(0)|+|c|2 t− |φ
′(0)|
2
[
Ξt |x|2 + γ¯t ( 2κ) [W
M
t (x) + ǫ− φ
′(0)
2 t]
]
+ 12 [Φ
M (b2)− c]µ(∆t(x, u)) . (50)
That is, with β as per (49),
µ(∆t(x, u)) ≤ β(M)
(
W
M
t (x) + ǫ+
|φ′(0)|+|c|
2 t+
|φ′(0)|
2
[
Ξt |x|2 + γ¯t ( 2κ) [W
M
t (x) + ǫ− φ(0)2 t]
])
= β(M)
(
[1 + γ¯t |φ
′(0)|
κ ](W
M
t (x) + ǫ) +
1
2 [|φ′(0)| + |c| − γ¯tκ |φ′(0)|φ(0)] t + 12 Ξt |φ′(0)| |x|2
)
,
from which (46) immediately follows by selecting ηt
.
= 1+ γ¯t |φ
′(0)|
κ , λt
.
= 12 [|φ′(0)|+|c|− γ¯tκ |φ′(0)|φ(0)] t,
and Ξt
.
= 12 Ξt |φ′(0)|.
(ii) Fix any x ∈ domW t, ǫ ∈ R>0. The left-hand equality of (47) holds follows by (16), (27), and
assertion (i), i.e. (46). In particular,
lim
M→∞
sup
u∈U M,ǫx [0,t]
µ(∆t(x, u)) ≤ lim
M→∞
β(M)
[
η
(
W
M
t (x) + ǫ
)
+ λt + Ξt |x|2
]
= 0.
It remains to show that the right-hand equality in (47) holds. Fix any u ∈ U ǫx [0, t]. Suppose there
exists δ ∈ R>0 such that µ(∆t(x, u)) ≥ δ > 0. An analogous calculation to (50), with WMt and ΦM
replaced with W t and supM≥−φ(0)Φ
M , yields
W t(x) + ǫ+
|φ(0)|+|c|
2 t+
|φ(0)|
2
[
Ξt |x|2 + γ¯t ( 2κ) [W t(x) + ǫ− φ(0)2 t]
]
> 12 sup
M≥−φ(0)
[ΦM (b2)− c] δ = 12 sup
M≥−φ(0)
[γb2(M)− c] δ =∞ ,
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in which the equalities follow as δ ∈ R>0, and by (18) and Lemma A.2. Hence, W t(x) = ∞, which
contradicts the definition of x ∈ domW t. Consequently, no such δ ∈ R>0 exists, so that µ(∆t(x, u)) =
0. As u ∈ U ǫx [0, t] is arbitrary, the right-hand equality in (47) follows as required.
(iii) Immediate by assertion (ii) and Theorem 4.3.
Remark 4.7. Theorem 4.6 indicates that the regulator problem defined by W t of (1) implements the
required state constraint for almost every time for those initial states x ∈ Rn for which W t(x) < ∞,
and that the approximating regulator problem defined byW
M
t of (21) implements the same constraint
in the limit as M →∞.
5 Equivalent unconstrained game representations
The sup-of-quadratics representation (12) for the convex barrier function Φ in (6) is used to demon-
strate equivalence of the value function defining the state constrained regulator problem (1) with
the upper value of an unconstrained two player game. Similarly, the approximate sup-of-quadratics
representation (18) is used to demonstrate an equivalence between the value function defining the
approximate regulator problem (21) with the corresponding upper value of an approximate two player
game. It is further demonstrated that this approximate game has equivalent upper and lower values,
which in turn is used to demonstrate the corresponding equivalence for the exact game, via the con-
vergence results of Theorem 3.7. The lower value is subsequently exploited to examine solutions of
the state constrained regulator problem (1) via families of DREs.
5.1 Exact unconstrained game and its upper value
Given a horizon t ∈ R≥0, define a function space by A [0, t] .=
{
α : [0, t]→ R≥−φ(0) |measurable
}
.
Motivated by (2), (3), (12), define the upper value Wt : R
n → R+ of a two player unconstrained linear
quadratic game by
Wt(x)
.
= inf
u∈U [0,t]
sup
α∈A [0,t]
Jt(x, u, α) (51)
for all x ∈ Rn, in which Jt is a cost function defined with respect to a new integrated running cost
function It motivated by (3), and the existing integrated running cost I
κ
t of (3) and terminal cost Ψ
of (4). In particular, define Jt, It : R
n ×U [0, t] ×A [0, t]→ R and ν : Rn × R≥−φ(0) → R by
Jt(x, u, α)
.
= It(x, u, α) + I
κ
t (u) + Ψ(ξt), (52)
It(x, u, α)
.
=
∫ t
0
ν(ξs, αs) ds, ξ
.
= χ(x, u), (53)
ν(x, αˆ)
.
= K2 |x|2 + 12 [a−1(αˆ) |x|2 − αˆ], (54)
for all x ∈ Rn, u ∈ U [0, t], α ∈ A [0, t], αˆ ∈ R≥−φ(0).
The value functions (1) and (51) defining the exact regulator problem and the exact unconstrained
game are in fact equivalent, as stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 5.1. Given t ∈ R≥0, the value functions W t, Wt of (1), (51) are equivalent, with W t(x) =
Wt(x) for all x ∈ Rn.
The proof of Theorem 5.1 follows as a consequence of a measurable selection lemma.
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Lemma 5.2. Given t ∈ R≥0, x ∈ Rn, u ∈ U [0, t], ξ .= χ(x, u) ∈ C([0, t];Rn), the following hold:
(i) The cost functions I¯t, It of (3), (53) associated with the exact regulator problem (1) and game
upper value (51) satisfy
I¯t(x, u) =
∫ t
0
sup
αˆ≥−φ(0)
ν(ξs, αˆ) ds = sup
α∈A [0,t]
It(x, u, α), (55)
in which ν is as per (54);
(ii) If µ(∆t(x, u)) = 0, see (45), then α
∗ ∈ A [0, t] given for any M ∈ R≥−φ(0) by
α∗s = αˆ
∆∗(|ξs|2) .=
{
a ◦ φ′(|ξs|2), s ∈ [0, t] \∆t(x, u),
M, s ∈ ∆t(x, u), (56)
satisfies
I¯t(x, u) = It(x, u, α
∗) ; (57)
(iii) If x ∈ domW t and u ∈ U ǫx [0, t], ǫ ∈ R>0, see (43), then (57) holds with α∗ ∈ A [0, t] as per (56),
for arbitrary M ∈ R≥−φ(0).
Proof. Fix t ∈ R≥0, x ∈ Rn, u ∈ U [0, t], and ξ .= χ(x, u) ∈ C([0, t];Rn). (i) The left-hand equality in
(55) is immediate by (3), (53), (54), and Theorem 3.2, in particular (12). For the right-hand equality,
first fix any α ∈ A [0, t], and note that it is pointwise suboptimal in the supremum over αˆ ≥ −φ(0).
That is,
∫ t
0 supαˆ≥−φ(0) ν(ξs, αˆ) ds ≥
∫ t
0 ν(ξs, αs) ds for all α ∈ A [0, t]. Hence,∫ t
0
sup
αˆ≥−φ(0)
ν(ξs, αˆ) ds ≥ sup
α∈A [0,t]
∫ t
0
ν(ξs, αs) ds = sup
α∈A [0,t]
It(x, u, α). (58)
In order to prove the opposite inequality, fix δ ∈ R>0, and suppose that u ∈ U [0, t] is such that
|∆t(x, u)| ≥ δ > 0, see (45). Given any α−, α+ ∈ R≥−φ(0), define piecewise constant α˘ ∈ A [0, t] by
α˘s =
{
α−, s ∈ [0, t] \∆t(x, u),
α+, s ∈ ∆t(x, u),
for all s ∈ [0, t]. Note that α˘ is suboptimal insofar as
sup
α∈A [0,t]
It(x, u, α) ≥ It(x, u, α˘) = I− +
∫
∆t(x,u)
ν(ξs, α
+) ds, I−
.
=
∫
[0,t]\∆t(x,u)
ν(ξs, α
−) ds .
As this is true for any α+ ∈ R≥−φ(0), it follows immediately that
sup
α∈A [0,t]
It(x, u, α) ≥ I− + sup
α+≥−φ(0)
∫
∆t(x,u)
ν(ξs, α
+) ds.
Lemma A.2 implies that ν(ξs, ·) = γ|ξs|2(·) is strictly increasing for any s ∈ ∆t(x, u) fixed, as |ξs|2 ≥ b2
by (45), with limα+→∞ ν(ξs, α
+) = K2 |ξs|2 + limα+→∞ γ|ξs|2(α+) = ∞. Consequently, there exists an
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M0 ∈ R≥−φ(0) such that ν(ξs, α+) ≥ a−1(α+) b2 − α+ > 0 for all α+ > M0. Hence, the monotone
convergence theorem implies that
sup
α∈A [0,t]
It(x, u, α) ≥ I− + lim
α+→∞
∫
∆t(x,u)
ν(ξs, α
+) ds = I− +
∫
∆t(x,u)
limα+→∞ ν(ξs, α
+) ds =∞.
As the left-hand side here is the right-hand side of (58), it follows immediately that the opposite
inequality to (58) always holds where |∆t(x, u)| ≥ δ > 0.
Alternatively, suppose u ∈ U [0, t] is such that µ(∆t(x, u)) = 0, and let α∗ ∈ A [0, t] be defined by
(56). Recalling the left-hand equality of (55), and the definition (13) of αˆ∗(·) in Theorem 3.2,
I¯t(x, u) =
∫ t
0
sup
αˆ≥−φ(0)
ν(ξs, αˆ) ds =
∫
[0,t]\∆t(x,u)
ν(ξs, αˆ
∗
s(|ξs|2)) ds =
∫
[0,t]\∆t(x,u)
ν(ξs, α
∗
s) ds
=
∫ t
0
ν(ξs, α
∗
s) ds ≤ sup
α∈A [0,t]
∫ t
0
ν(ξs, αs) ds = sup
α∈A [0,t]
It(x, u, α) . (59)
Combining this inequality with (58) yields (55).
(ii) Immediate by the fourth equality of (59).
(iii) Fix x ∈ domW t, ǫ ∈ R>0, u ∈ U ǫx [0, t]. Theorem 4.6 (ii) implies that µ(∆(x, u)) = 0, so that
assertion (ii) above applies.
Theorem 5.1 then follows by Lemma 5.2 (i) and comparison of (1)–(3) and (51)–(54).
5.2 Approximate game and its upper and lower values
Given M ∈ R≥−φ(0), t ∈ R≥0, define A M [0, t] .= C([0, t]; [−φ(0),M ]). Analogous to the exact game
defined by (51), define the upper value WMt : R
n → R of an approximating two player unconstrained
linear quadratic game by
WMt (x)
.
= inf
u∈U [0,t]
sup
α∈A M [0,t]
Jt(x, u, α) (60)
for all x ∈ Rn, where cost Jt is as per (52). As in the exact case, the value function (21) of the
approximating regulator problem and the upper value (60) of the approximating game are equivalent.
Theorem 5.3. Given t ∈ R≥0, M ∈ R≥−φ(0), the value functions WMt , WMt of (21), (60) are
equivalent, with W
M
t (x) =W
M
t (x) for all x ∈ Rn.
The proof of Theorem 5.3 follows as a consequence of a corresponding measurable selection lemma.
Lemma 5.4. Given any t ∈ R≥0, M ∈ R≥−φ(0), x ∈ Rn, u ∈ U [0, t], and ξ .= χ(x, u) ∈ C([0, t];Rn),
the cost functions I¯Mt , It and J
M
t , Jt of (23), (53) and (22), (52) satisfy
I¯Mt (x, u) =
∫ t
0
sup
αˆ∈[−φ(0),M ]
ν(ξs, αˆ) ds = sup
α∈A M [0,t]
It(x, u, α) = It(x, u, α
M∗) , (61)
J¯Mt (x, u) = sup
α∈A M [0,t]
Jt(x, u, α) = Jt(x, u, α
M∗) , (62)
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in which αM∗ ∈ A M [0, t] is defined via (19) by, and satisfies,
αM∗s
.
= αˆM∗(|ξs|2) , s ∈ [0, t] , (63)
αM∗ ∈ argmax
α∈A M [0,t]
It(x, u, α) ≡ argmax
α∈A M [0,t]
Jt(x, u, α) . (64)
The proof of Lemma 5.4 follows analogously to that of Lemma 5.2 and is omitted.
Theorem 5.3 subsequently follows by Lemma 5.4 and comparison of (21)–(23) and (52)–(54), (60).
With a view to addressing computation, the remaining objective is to demonstrate equivalence of
the upper and lower values for the game (60). To this end, a number of useful properties of the cost
function Jt of (52) are summarised via the following two lemmas.
Lemma 5.5. Given any t ∈ R>0, x ∈ Rn, M ∈ R≥−φ(0), α ∈ A M [0, t], the cost function Jt(x, ·, α) :
U [0, t]→ R defined by (52) is Fre`chet differentiable, strictly convex, and coercive.
Proof. The proof follows analogous arguments to that of Lemma 4.2, and the details are omitted.
Remark 5.6. The strict convexity assertion in Lemma 5.5 requires t ∈ R>0, see also Remark 4.4.
Lemma 5.7. Given t ∈ R>0, M ∈ R≥−φ(0), and x ∈ Rn, let uM∗ ∈ U [0, t] be defined as per (40), and
let αM∗
.
= αˆM∗(|χ(x, uM∗)|2) ∈ A M [0, t] be defined via (5), (63). Then, uM∗ and αM∗ are unique,
and together satisfy
argmin
u∈U [0,t]
J¯Mt (x, u) = u
M∗ = argmin
u∈U [0,t]
Jt(x, ·, αM∗) .
Proof. Fix t ∈ R>0, M ∈ R≥−φ(0). Define uM∗ ∈ U [0, t] uniquely as per (40), i.e. as per the left-
hand equality in the lemma statement. Given this uM∗, define αM∗ ∈ A M [0, t] as per the lemma
statement, and note by Lemma 5.4 that αM∗ is unique by definition. Recall by Lemma 5.5 that
Jt(x, ·, αM∗) : U [0, t] → R is Fre`chet differentiable and strictly convex. Hence, in order to show that
Jt(x, ·, αM∗) is (uniquely) minimized at uM∗, it is sufficient to show that the directional derivative of
Jt(x, ·, αM∗) is nonnegative in all directions when evaluated at uM∗. The details follow.
Fix any u˜ ∈ U [0, t] with ‖u˜‖U [0,t] = 1. The Fre`chet derivative DuJt(x, uM∗, αM∗) ∈ L(U [0, t];R),
and corresponding Riesz representation ∇uJt(x, uM∗, αM∗) ∈ U [0, t], at uM∗ ∈ U [0, t], satisfy
DuJt(x, u
M∗, αM∗)(u˜) = 〈∇uJt(x, uM∗, αM∗), u˜〉U [0,t]
= lim
δ→0+
{
Jt(x, u
M∗ + δ u˜, αM∗)− Jt(x, uM∗, αM∗)
δ
}
. (65)
Fix any ǫ ∈ R>0 with ǫ2 < min(1, ρˆ(M)), and ρˆ(M) as per (15). Let Lt .= ‖A‖L(U [0,t];C([0,t];Rn)) ∈ R>0,
with A as per (9), and δ¯ǫ .= ǫ/(4Lt) ∈ R>0. Fix any δ ∈ (0, δ¯ǫ]. Define
u˜M∗
.
= uM∗ + δ u˜ , ξ˜M∗
.
= χ(x, u˜M∗) , ξM∗
.
= χ(x, uM∗) ,
α˜M∗s
.
= αˆM∗(|ξ˜M∗s |2) , αM∗s .= αˆM∗(|ξM∗s |2), (66)
for all s ∈ [0, t], with χ, αˆM∗ as per (5), (19). Recalling (5) and Lemma 2.1, note in particular that
‖ξ˜M∗ − ξM∗‖C([0,t];Rn) ≤ Lt δ ‖u˜‖U [0,t] = Lt δ ≤ Lt δ¯ǫ ≤ ǫ4 . (67)
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By (52), (53), (54), and Lemma 5.4,
Jt(x, u
M∗, αM∗) = J¯t(x, u
M∗),
Jt(x, u˜
M∗, αM∗) =
∫ t
0
ν(ξ˜M∗s , α
M∗
s ) ds + I
κ
t (u˜
M∗) + Ψ(ξ˜M∗t )
=
∫ t
0
ν(ξ˜M∗s , α˜
M∗
s ) + [ν(ξ˜
M∗
s , α
M∗
s )− ν(ξ˜M∗s , α˜M∗s )] ds+ Iκt (u˜M∗) + Ψ(ξ˜M∗t )
= J¯t(x, u˜
M∗) +
∫ t
0
ν(ξ˜M∗s , α
M∗
s )− ν(ξ˜M∗s , α˜M∗s ) ds,
so that, by subtraction,
Jt(x, u˜
M∗, αM∗)− Jt(x, uM∗, αM∗)
= J¯Mt (x, u˜
M∗)− J¯Mt (x, uM∗) +
∫ t
0
ν(ξ˜M∗s , α
M∗
s )− ν(ξ˜M∗s , α˜M∗s ) ds. (68)
As uM∗ is the minimizer of J¯Mt (x, ·), see Theorem 4.3 and (40), a lower bound for the integral term in
the right-hand side of (68) is sought, as a function of δ, using Taylor’s theorem. To this end, it may
be shown with some calculation via (19), (54), (66), (99) that
αM∗s − α˜M∗s =

a ◦ φ′(|ξM∗s |2)− a ◦ φ′(|ξ˜M∗s |2) , |ξ˜M∗s |2 < ρˆ(M) , |ξM∗s |2 < ρˆ(M) ,
M − a ◦ φ′(|ξ˜M∗s |2) , |ξ˜M∗s |2 < ρˆ(M) ≤ |ξM∗s |2 ,
a ◦ φ′(|ξM∗s |2)−M , |ξ˜M∗s |2 ≥ ρˆ(M) > |ξM∗s |2
0 , |ξ˜M∗s |2 ≥ ρˆ(M), |ξM∗s |2 ≥ ρˆ(M) ,
∂ν
∂αˆ(ξ˜
M∗
s , α˜
M∗
s ) =
|ξ˜M∗s |2
a′ ◦ a−1(α˜M∗s )
− 1 =
{
0 , |ξ˜M∗s |2 < ρˆ(M) ,
|ξ˜M∗s |
2
ρˆ(M) − 1 , |ξ˜M∗s |2 ≥ ρˆ(M) ,
(69)
∂2ν
∂α2
(ξ˜M∗s , α˜
M∗
s ) =
−|ξ˜M∗s |2
2φ′′(a′ ◦ a−1(α˜M∗s )) [a′ ◦ a−1(α˜M∗s )]3
=

−1
2φ′′(|ξ˜M∗s |
2) |ξ˜M∗s |
2
, |ξ˜M∗s |2 < ρˆ(M) ,
−|ξ˜M∗s |
2
2φ′′(ρˆ(M)) [ρˆ(M)]3
, |ξ˜M∗s |2 ≥ ρˆ(M) ,
in which the derivatives follow by Lemma A.2 and the identity ν(ξ˜M∗s , α) =
K
2 |ξ˜M∗s |2+ 12 γ|ξ˜M∗s |2(α) for
all α ∈ R≥−φ(0), with γ(·) as per (99). Observe that the second partial derivative in (69) is unbounded
if |ξ˜M∗s | → 0. Two cases are thus considered, (i) s ∈ ∆ǫ0, and (ii) s ∈ [0, t] \∆ǫ0, in which
∆ǫ0
.
=
{
s ∈ [0, t] ∣∣ |ξM∗s | ≤ ǫ2} ⊂ [0, t]. (70)
(i) Fix s ∈ ∆ǫ0. The triangle inequality, (67), (70) imply that |ξ˜M∗s | ≤ |ξ˜M∗s − ξM∗s | + |ξM∗s | ≤
ǫ
4 +
ǫ
2 =
3 ǫ
4 , so that max(|ξ˜M∗s |2, |ξM∗s |2) ≤ ǫ2 < ρˆ(M) by definition of ǫ. Hence, (19), (66) yield
α˜M∗s = a ◦ φ′(|ξ˜M∗s |2), αM∗s = a ◦ φ′(|ξM∗s |2), so that a−1(α˜M∗s ) = φ′(|ξ˜M∗s |2), a−1(αM∗s ) = φ′(|ξM∗s |2).
Note also that a ◦ φ′ is differentiable by Lemma A.1, with (a ◦ φ′)′(ρ) = [a′ ◦ φ′(ρ)]φ′′(ρ) = ρφ′′(ρ) for
all ρ ∈ [0, ǫ]. Hence, (54), the triangle inequality, Taylor’s theorem, and (67) together imply that the
integrand in (68) satisfies
|ν(ξ˜M∗s , αM∗s )− ν(ξ˜M∗s , α˜M∗s )|
≤ 12 |a−1(αM∗s )− a−1(α˜M∗s )| |ξ˜M∗s |2 + 12 |α˜M∗s − αM∗s |
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≤ ǫ22 |φ′(|ξM∗s |2)− φ′(|ξ˜M∗s |2)|+ 12 |a ◦ φ′(|ξM∗s |2)− a ◦ φ′(|ξ˜M∗s |2)|
≤ 12
(
ǫ2 |φ′′(µs)|+ |ρs φ′′(ρs)|
) ∣∣∣|ξM∗s |2 − |ξ˜M∗s |2∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ2 (ǫ+ 1) sup
ρ∈[0,ǫ]
|φ′′(ρ)|
∣∣∣|ξM∗s |2 − |ξ˜M∗s |2∣∣∣
≤ ǫ sup
ρ∈[0,ρˆ(M)]
|φ′′(ρ)| (|ξM∗s |+ |ξ˜M∗s |) |ξM∗s − ξ˜M∗s | ≤ 2 ǫ2 sup
ρ∈[0,ρˆ(M)]
|φ′′(ρ)| |ξM∗s − ξ˜M∗s | ≤ KM0 (ǫ) δ ,
in which ǫ < 1 by definition, and µs, ρs ∈ [0, ǫ] ⊂ [0, ρˆ(M)] lie in an interval defined by the end points
|ξM∗s |2 and |ξ˜M∗s |2, and
KM0 (ǫ)
.
= LM1 ǫ
2 , LM1
.
= sup
ρ∈[0,ρˆ(M)]
2 |φ′′(ρ)| . (71)
As s ∈ ∆ǫ0 is arbitrary, integration yields∫
∆ǫ0
ν(ξ˜M∗s , α
M∗
s )− ν(ξ˜M∗s , α˜M∗s ) ds ≥
∫
∆ǫ0
−|ν(ξ˜M∗s , αM∗s )− ν(ξ˜M∗s , α˜M∗s )| ds ≥ −tKM0 (ǫ) δ . (72)
(ii) Fix any s ∈ [0, t]\∆ǫ0. As |ξM∗s | > ǫ2 , by definition of ∆ǫ0, the triangle inequality and (67) imply
that |ξ˜M∗s | ≥ |ξM∗s |− |ξ˜M∗s − ξM∗s | > ǫ2 − ǫ4 = ǫ4 , so that ξ˜M∗s , ξM∗s 6∈ BRn [0; ǫ4 ]. Consequently, (66), (69)
imply that ∂ν∂α(ξ˜
M
s , α˜
M∗
s ) and
∂2ν
∂α2
(ξ˜Ms , α¯s) exist and are uniformly bounded for s ∈ [0, t], given any α¯s
contained in the interval defined by the end points α˜M∗s and α
M∗
s . By Taylor’s theorem, such an α¯s
exists, and satisfies
ν(ξ˜M∗s , α
M∗
s )− ν(ξ˜M∗s , α˜M∗s ) = ∂ν∂αˆ(ξ˜M∗s , α˜M∗s ) (αM∗s − α˜M∗s ) + 12 ∂
2ν
∂αˆ2
(ξ˜M∗s , α¯s) (α
M∗
s − α˜M∗s )2 . (73)
Note by inspection of the various cases in (69) that the first order term is equivalently given by
∂ν
∂αˆ (ξ˜
M∗
s , α˜
M∗
s ) (α
M∗
s − α˜M∗s ) =
{
(a ◦ φ′(|ξM∗s |2)−M) ( |ξ˜
M∗
s |
2
ρˆ(M) − 1), |ξ˜M∗s |2 ≥ ρˆ(M) > |ξM∗s |2 ,
0 , otherwise.
Let RM
.
= ‖ξM∗‖C([0,t];Rn) > ǫ2 , and note that |ξ˜M∗s | ≤ |ξM∗s |+ |ξ˜M∗s − ξM∗s | ≤ RM + ǫ4 , by (67). In the
non-zero case above, as M = a ◦ φ′(ρˆ(M)), a second application of Taylor’s theorem yields
|a ◦ φ′(|ξM∗s |2)−M | = |a ◦ φ′(ρˆ(M) + [|ξM∗s |2 − ρˆ(M)]) − a ◦ φ′(ρˆ(M))|
= |(a ◦ φ′)′(µs)|
∣∣|ξM∗s |2 − ρˆ(M)∣∣ = |µs φ′′(µs)| ∣∣|ξM∗s |2 − ρˆ(M)∣∣
≤ sup
µ∈[0,ρˆ(M)]
|µφ′′(µ)|
∣∣∣|ξM∗s |2 − |ξ˜M∗s |2∣∣∣ ≤ ρˆ(M) sup
µ∈[0,ρˆ(M)]
|φ′′(µ)|
(
|ξM∗s |+ |ξ˜M∗s |
)
|ξM∗s − ξ˜M∗s |
≤ ρˆ(M) sup
µ∈[0,ρˆ(M)]
|φ′′(µ)| (2RM + ǫ4)Lt δ = ρˆ(M)LM1 (RM + ǫ8)Lt δ .
in which µs ∈ [|ξM∗s |2, ρˆ(M)]. Similarly,∣∣∣ |ξ˜M∗s |2ρˆ(M) − 1∣∣∣ ≤ 1ρˆ(M) ∣∣∣|ξM∗s |2 − |ξ˜M∗s |2∣∣∣ ≤ 2ρˆ(M) (RM + ǫ8)Lt δ .
Hence, combining these inequalities yields a lower bound for the first order term, with
∂ν
∂αˆ(ξ˜
M∗
s , α˜
M∗
s ) (α
M∗
s − α˜M∗s ) ≥ −| ∂ν∂αˆ (ξ˜M∗s , α˜M∗s ) (αM∗s − α˜M∗s )| ≥ −KM1 (ǫ) δ2 , (74)
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with KM1 (ǫ)
.
= 2LM1
(
RM + ǫ8
)2
L2t .
The second order term in (73) has the same form as (69), with
∂2ν
∂α2
(ξ˜M∗s , α¯s) =
−|ξ˜M∗s |2
2φ′′(a′ ◦ a−1(α¯s)) [a′ ◦ a−1(α¯s)]3 =
−|ξ˜M∗s |2
2φ′′ ◦ ρˆ(α¯s) [ρˆ(α¯s)]3 ,
in which α¯s is in the interval defined by the end points α˜
M∗
s and α
M∗
s . As ξ˜
M∗
s , ξ
M∗
s 6∈ BRn [0; ǫ4 ], (66)
implies that αM∗s , α˜
M∗
s ∈ [a ◦ φ′( ǫ
2
16 ),M ], so that α¯s ∈ [a ◦ φ′( ǫ
2
16),M ]. Hence, Lemma A.1, i.e. (94),
yields
| ∂2ν
∂α2
(ξ˜M∗s , α¯s)| ≤
|ξ˜M∗s |2
inf
ρ∈[ǫ2/16,ρˆ(M)]
{2 ρ3 φ′′(ρ)} ≤ L
M
2 (
16
ǫ2
)3 (RM + ǫ4)
2 , LM2
.
= sup
ρ∈[0,ρˆ(M)]
[2φ′′(ρ)]−1.
Furthermore, in each of the four cases listed for αM∗s − α˜M∗s in (69), Taylor’s theorem again yields
|αM∗s − α˜M∗s | ≤ (a ◦ φ)′(ρs)
∣∣∣|ξM∗s |2 − |ξ˜M∗s |2∣∣∣ ≤ sup
ρ∈[0,ρˆ(M)]
ρφ′′(ρ) (|ξM∗s |+ |ξ˜M∗s |) |ξM∗s − ξ˜M∗s |
≤ ρˆ(M)LM1 (RM + ǫ8)Lt δ ,
in which ρs ∈ [0, ρˆ(M)] in every case. Hence, a lower bound for the second order term is
1
2
∂2ν
∂αˆ2 (ξ˜
M∗
s , α¯s) (α
M∗
s − α˜M∗s )2 ≥ −12 | ∂
2ν
∂αˆ2 (ξ˜
M∗
s , α¯s)| |αM∗s − α˜M∗s |2 ≥ −KM2 (ǫ) δ2 , (75)
with KM2 (ǫ)
.
= 12 L
M
2 (
16
ǫ2
)3 (RM + ǫ4)
2 [ρˆ(M)LM1 (R
M + ǫ8 )Lt]
2. Thus, integrating (73) via (74), (75),∫
[0,t]\∆ǫ0
ν(ξ˜M∗s , α
M∗
s )− ν(ξ˜M∗s , α˜M∗s ) ds
=
∫
[0,t]\∆ǫ0
∂ν
∂αˆ(ξ˜
M∗
s , α˜
M∗
s ) (α
M∗
s − α˜M∗s ) + 12 ∂
2ν
∂αˆ2 (ξ˜
M∗
s , α¯s) (α
M∗
s − α˜M∗s )2 ds
≥
∫
[0,t]\∆ǫ0
−KM1 (ǫ) δ2 −KM2 (ǫ) δ2 ds ≥ −t [KM1 (ǫ) +KM2 (ǫ)] δ2 . (76)
Cases (i) and (ii) may now be combined, via (72) and (76), in (68), with
Jt(x, u˜
M∗, αM∗)− Jt(x, uM∗, αM∗) = J¯Mt (x, u˜M∗)− J¯Mt (x, uM∗)
+
∫
∆ǫ0
ν(ξ˜M∗s , α
M∗
s )− ν(ξ˜M∗s , α˜M∗s ) ds +
∫
[0,t]\∆ǫ0
ν(ξ˜M∗s , α
M∗
s )− ν(ξ˜M∗s , α˜M∗s ) ds
≥ J¯Mt (x, u˜M∗)− J¯Mt (x, uM∗)− tKM0 (ǫ) δ − t [KM1 (ǫ) +KM2 (ǫ)] δ2 .
Recalling (66), a lower bound for the directional derivative (65) can subsequently be evaluated, with
DuJt(x, u
M∗, αM∗(u˜) = lim
δ→0+
{
Jt(x, u
M∗ + δ u˜, αM∗)− Jt(x, uM∗, αM∗)
δ
}
≥ lim inf
δ→0+
{
J¯Mt (x, u
M∗ + δ u˜)− J¯t(x, uM∗)
δ
}
− tKM0 (ǫ) ≥ −tKM0 (ǫ) ,
22
in which the second inequality follows by Theorem 4.3, i.e. (40). Furthermore, as ǫ ∈ R>0 can be
selected arbitrarily small, cf. its definition prior to (66), and KM0 (0) = 0 by (71), it follows that
DuJt(x, u
M∗, αM∗)(u˜) ≥ lim inf
δ→0+
{
J¯Mt (x, u
M∗ + δ u˜)− J¯t(x, uM∗)
δ
}
,
in which u˜ ∈ U [0, t], ‖u˜‖U [0,t] = 1, is arbitrary. Hence, uM∗ ∈ U [0, t] minimizes Jt(x, ·, αM∗).
Theorem 5.8. Given t ∈ R>0, M ∈ R≥−φ(0), x ∈ Rn, and uM∗, αM∗ as per Lemma 5.7,
W
M
t (x) =W
M
t (x) = inf
u∈U [0,t]
sup
α∈A M [0,t]
Jt(x, u, α)
= min
u∈U [0,t]
max
α∈A M [0,t]
Jt(x, u, α) = max
α∈A M [0,t]
min
u∈U [0,t]
Jt(x, u, α) = Jt(x, u
M∗, αM∗) (77)
Proof. Fix t ∈ R>0, M ∈ R≥−φ(0), x ∈ Rn, and αM∗, uM∗ as per Lemma 5.7. Recalling Theorem 5.3,
W
M
t (x) =W
M
t (x) = inf
u∈U [0,t]
sup
α∈A M [0,t]
Jt(x, u, α) ≥ sup
α∈A M [0,t]
inf
u∈U [0,t]
Jt(x, u, α).
For the opposite inequality, and existence of the minimizer and maximzer as per the final equality in
(77), note by Theorem 4.3, Lemma 5.4, the definition of αM∗, and finally Lemma 5.7, that
inf
u∈U [0,t]
sup
α∈A M [0,t]
Jt(x, u, α) = inf
u∈U [0,t]
J¯Mt (x, u) = J¯
M
t (x, u
M∗) = Jt(x, u
M∗, αM∗),
= min
u∈U [0,t]
Jt(x, u, α
M∗) ≤ max
α∈A M [0,t]
min
u∈U [0,t]
Jt(x, u, α) = sup
α∈A M [0,t]
inf
u∈U [0,t]
Jt(x, u, α) .
Corollary 5.9. Given t ∈ R>0 and x ∈ Rn, the game upper value defined by Wt of (51) and the
corresponding game lower value are equivalent, with
Wt(x)
.
= inf
u∈U [0,t]
sup
α∈A [0,t]
Jt(x, u, α) = sup
α∈A [0,t]
inf
u∈U [0,t]
Jt(x, u, α). (78)
Proof. Fix t ∈ R>0, x ∈ Rm. Applying Theorem 5.1, followed by Theorems 3.7 and 5.8,
Wt(x) =W t(x) = sup
M≥−φ(0)
W
M
t (x) = sup
M≥−φ(0)
WMt (x) = sup
M≥−φ(0)
inf
u∈U [0,t]
sup
α∈A M [0,t]
Jt(x, α, u)
= sup
M≥−φ(0)
sup
α∈A M [0,t]
inf
u∈U [0,t]
Jt(x, u, α) = sup
α∈A [0,t]
inf
u∈U [0,t]
Jt(x, u, α).
5.3 Computation via the lower value
Theorems 5.1, 5.3, 5.8, and Corollary 5.9, together establish equivalences of the exact and approximate
regulator problems (1) and (21) with the corresponding exact and approximate games (51), (60), (77),
(78), and that the upper and lower values of these games are equivalent in both cases. With a view
to computation, via the value function and optimal trajectories corresponding to the approximate
regulator problem (21), it is useful to explicitly consider the lower value of the approximate game. To
this end, given t ∈ R≥0, M ∈ R≥−φ(0), α ∈ A M [0, t], define an auxiliary value function Ŵαt by
Ŵαt (x)
.
= inf
u∈U [0,t]
Jt(x, u, α) (79)
for all t ∈ R≥0, x ∈ Rn. The following is then immediate.
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Lemma 5.10. Given any t ∈ R≥0, M ∈ R≥−φ(0), the value functions WMt , Ŵαt : Rn → R+, α ∈
A M [0, t], of (51), (79) satisfy WMt (x) = supα∈A M [0,t] Ŵ
α
t (x) for all x ∈ Rn.
By inspection of (52), (53), (54), Ŵαt of (79) defines the value of an LQR problem, parameterized
by α ∈ A M [0, t]. In order to demonstrate that Ŵαt has an explicit quadratic representation, it is
convenient to consider the final value problem (FVP)
− ˙ˆPαs = Aˆ′ Pˆαs + Pˆαs Aˆ− 1κ Pˆαs Bˆ Bˆ′ Pˆαs + Vˆ αs , Pˆαt = Pˆt, (80)
for all s ∈ [0, t], in which Aˆ, Pˆt, Vˆs ∈ R(n+1)×(n+1), s ∈ [0, t], Bˆ ∈ R(n+1)×m, Cˆ ∈ Rn×(n+1) are defined
in terms of κ, K of (2), A, B of (5), and Pt of (4) by
Aˆ
.
=
(
A 0n
0′n 0
)
, Bˆ
.
=
(
B
0′m
)
, Pˆt
.
=
(
Pt Qt
Q′t Rt
)
, Vˆ αs
.
=
(
[K + a−1(αs)] In 0n
0′n −αs
)
,
Qt
.
= −Pt z, Rt .= 〈z, Pt z〉, (81)
in which In ∈ Rn×n and 0n ∈ Rn×1 denote the identity matrix and zero vector respectively. Solutions
to FVP (80), where they exist, take the compatibly partitioned form
Pˆαs
.
=
(
Pαs Q
α
s
(Qαs )
′ Rαs
)
, (82)
for all s ∈ [0, t].
Remark 5.11. FVP (80) may be equivalently expressed as three component FVPs
− P˙αs = A′ Pαs + Pαs A− 1κ Pαs BB′ Pαs + [K + a−1(αs)]In, Pαt = Pt, (83)
− Q˙αs = (A− 1κ BB′ Pαs )′Qαs , Qαt = Qt, (84)
− R˙αs = −αs − 1κ (Qαs )′BB′Qαs , s ∈ (0, t), Rαt = Rt, (85)
in which the respective boundary data follows by (4), (81).
Lemma 5.12. Given fixed t ∈ R>0, M ∈ R≥−φ(0), and any α ∈ A M [0, t], there exists a unique
Pˆα ∈ C([0, t]; Σn+1) ∩ C1((0, t); Σn+1) of the form (82) that satisfies FVP (80).
Proof. See for example [18, Theorem 37, p.364] or [19, 7, Lemma 2.2, p. 391].
Theorem 5.13. Given any t ∈ R>0, M ∈ R≥−φ(0), α ∈ A M [0, t], the auxiliary value function Ŵαt of
(79) satisfies Ŵαt (x) = W˘
α
t (0, x) for all x ∈ Rn, where W˘αt : [0, t]× Rn → R+ is given by
W˘αt (s, x)
.
= 12
〈(
x
1
)
, [Pˆαt ]s
(
x
1
)〉
for all s ∈ [0, t], x ∈ Rn, in which Pˆαt ∈ C([0, t]; Σn+1)∩C1((0, t); Σn+1) is the unique solution of FVP
(80). Furthermore, the optimal input uα ∈ U [0, t] in (79) has the state feedback characterization
ξ˙αs = Aξ
α
s +B u
α
s , ξ
α
0 = x,
uαs
.
= − 1κ B′ [Pαs ξαs +Qαs ], s ∈ (0, t),
(86)
for any x ∈ Rn, where Pαs , Qαs are as per (83), (84).
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Proof. Fix arbitrary t ∈ R>0, M ∈ R≥−φ(0), and α ∈ A M [0, t]. Applying Lemma 5.12, there exists a
unique Pˆα ∈ C([0, t]; Σn+1) ∩C1((0, t); Σn+1) of the form (82) that satisfies FVP (80). Consequently,
given any s ∈ (0, t), x ∈ Rn, (80), (82), (83), (84), (85) imply that
∂W˘αt
∂s (s, x) =
1
2 〈x, P˙αs x〉+ 〈x, Q˙αs 〉+ 12 R˙αs
= −12 〈x, (A′ Pαs + Pαs A− 1κ Pαs BB′ Pαs + [K + a−1(αs)]In)x〉
− 〈x, (A− 1κ BB′ Pαs )′Qαs 〉+ 12 [αs + 1κ (Qαs )′BB′Qαs ],
∇xW˘αt (s, x) = Pαs x+Qαs . (87)
Define the Hamiltonian Hα : [0, t]× Rn × Rn → R by
Hα(s, x, p)
.
= 〈p, Ax〉 − 12κ 〈p, B B′ p〉+ 12 [K + a−1(αs)] |x|2 − αs2
= inf
u∈Rm
{〈p, Ax+B u〉+ κ2 |u|2 + 12 [K + a−1](αs)] |x|2 − αs2 } (88)
for all x, p ∈ Rn, s ∈ [0, t]. Combining (87), (88), note that −∂W˘αt∂s (s, x) = Hα(s, x,∇xW˘αt (s, x)). Fix
any u¯ ∈ U [0, t]. Define ξ¯ .= χ(x, u¯) via (5), and observe via (88) that u¯s is pointwise suboptimal in
Hα(s, ξ¯s,∇xW˘αt (s, ξ¯s)) for any s ∈ [0, t]. Consequently,
0 ≤ ∂W˘αt∂s (s, ξ¯s) + 〈∇xW˘αt (s, ξ¯s), A ξ¯s +B u¯s〉+ κ2 |u¯s|2 + 12 [K + a−1](αs)] |ξ¯s|2 − αs2
= ddsW˘
α
t (s, ξ¯s) +
κ
2 |u¯s|2 + 12 [K + a−1](αs)] |ξ¯s|2 − αs2 .
Integrating with respect to s ∈ [0, t], and observing that W˘αt (t, x) = Ψ(x), yields
W˘αt (0, x) ≤
∫ t
0
κ
2 |u¯s|2 + 12 [K + a−1](αs)] |ξ¯s|2 − αs2 ds+Ψ(ξ¯t) = Jt(x, u¯, α).
As u¯ ∈ U [0, t] is arbitrary, it follows by (79) that
W˘αt (0, x) ≤ Ŵαt (x) , (89)
for all x ∈ Rn. Consider the initial value problem (86). By Lemma 5.12, note that ξα ∈ L2([0, t];Rn)
and uα ∈ U [0, t]. Note further that uαs ∈ Rm is pointwise optimal in Hα(s, ξαs ,∇xW˘αt (s, ξαs )) for any
s ∈ [0, t]. Hence, repeating the above argument and applying (79), (89),
Ŵαt (x) ≤ Jt(x, uα, α) = W˘αt (0, x) ≤ Ŵαt (x).
Recalling that x ∈ Rn is arbitrary completes the proof.
Theorem 5.14. Given any t ∈ R>0, M ∈ R≥−φ(0), suppose there exists a unique solution
P ∗ ∈ C([0, t]; Σn) ∩ C1((0, t); Σn), Q∗, ξ∗ ∈ C([0, t];Rn) ∩ C1((0, t);Rn)
of the two point boundary value problem (TPBVP)
−P˙ ∗s = A′ P ∗s + P ∗s A− 1κ P ∗s BB′ P ∗s + [K + a−1 ◦ αˆM∗(|ξ∗s |2)] In , P ∗t = Pt,
−Q˙∗s = (A− 1κ BB′ P ∗s )′Q∗s , Q∗t = Qt = −Pt z,
25
ξ˙∗s = (A− 1κ BB′ P ∗s ) ξ∗s − 1κ BB′Q∗s , ξ0 = x, (90)
for all s ∈ (0, t), where Pt, z are as per (4). Then, the optimal inputs u∗ = uM∗ ∈ U [0, t], α∗ =
αM∗ ∈ A M [0, t] in (77) are given by the state feedback characterizations
u∗s = − 1κ B′(P ∗s ξ∗s +Q∗s) , α∗s = αˆM∗(|ξ∗s |2) , (91)
for all s ∈ [0, t], in which αˆM∗ is as per (19), (63).
Proof. Fix t ∈ R>0, M ∈ R≥−φ(0), and suppose that a unique solution of TPBVP (90) exists as per
the theorem statement. Inputs u∗ ∈ U [0, t] and α∗ ∈ A M [0, t] of (91) thus exist and are uniquely
defined by (90), (91). Applying Theorem 5.13, i.e. (86), with α
.
= α∗ yields the optimal control in
(79), with uM∗s = u
α
s = − 1κ B′ (Pαs ξαs +Qαs ), in which Pα, Qα, ξα are as per (86). Note by inspection
that Pα, Qα satisfy the FVPs defined by (83), (84), which are precisely the FVPs defined by the first
two equations of (90). By assertion, these FVPs exhibit a unique solution given by P ∗, Q∗, so that
Pα ≡ P ∗, Qα ≡ Q∗. Consequently, (86) and (91) imply that
uαs = − 1κ B′ (Pαs ξαs +Qαs ) = − 1κ B′ (P ∗s ξ∗s +Q∗s) = u∗s, (92)
for all s ∈ [0, t], so that ξα ≡ ξ∗ by (86). Consequently, αs = α∗s = αˆM∗(|ξ∗s |2) = αˆM∗(|[χ(x, u∗)]s|2)
for all s ∈ [0, t]. Hence, Lemma 5.4 implies that
J¯Mt (x, u
∗) = sup
α∈A M [0,t]
Jt(x, u
∗, α) = Jt(x, u
∗, α∗)
≥WMt (x) = sup
α∈A M [0,t]
Ŵαt (x) = sup
α∈A M [0,t]
Jt(x, u
α, α) = sup
α∈A M [0,t]
Jt(x, u
∗, α) ≥ Jt(x, u∗, α∗) ,
in which the first inequality is immediate by (21), and the last inequality follows by (92). Hence,
W
M
t (x) = Jt(x, u
∗, α∗), and uniqueness via Theorem 5.8 and Lemma 5.7 imply that u∗ = uM∗ and
α∗ = αM∗ as required.
Remark 5.15. Theorem 5.14 implies that the unique optimal inputs uM∗ and αM∗ of Theorem 5.8
and Lemma 5.7 can be computed via the state feedback characterizations (91), which depend on the
solution of TPBVP (90). Consequently, as expected, a shooting method applied to TPBVP (90) will
yield numerical approximations of these optimal inputs in specific examples.
Remark 5.16. Recent work [14] by the authors has further generalized the approach described in
this paper to include linear time-varying dynamics, and convex constraints defined by the intersection
of a finite collection of p ∈ N ellipses. The latter generalization involves an increase in the dimension
of the range of the actions of the barrier penalty negotiating player, i.e. αs ∈ Rp, s ∈ [0, t]. Crucially,
the dimension of the DRE (80), or equivalently the DREs (83), (84), (85), does not change, so that the
dimension of the dynamics underlying the TPBVP involved does not increase beyond that presented
here. The interested reader is referred to [14] for some preliminary details and examples.
6 Illustrative example
In illustrating an application of Theorems 5.1, 5.8, and 5.14 the approximate solution of a state
constrained regulator problem (1) via the approximate problem (21) and corresponding game (60), a
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simple example is considered. The linear dynamics (5) and barrier (6) are specified by
A
.
=
[ −1 2
−1 1
]
, B
.
=
[
1
0
]
,
φ : [0, b2)→ R, b .= 3,
φ(ρ)
.
= − log(1− ρ/9), ρ ∈ [0, b2), (93)
while the running cost (3) and its approximation (23) are specified by t
.
= 4, κ
.
= 1, K
.
= 0.1, and
M
.
= 50. The sup-of-quadratics representation for ΦM provided by Theorem 3.5 is illustrated in
Figure 1a. The trajectory defined by TPBVP (90) is computed using a standard shooting method,
which integrates the state dynamics (5) and FVP (80) backward in time from the known terminal cost
P̂ ∗t = P̂t ∈ Σ3, and a candidate terminal state ξ∗t = ξt ∈ R2. The error in the obtained initial state
|x− ξ∗0 | is subsequently iteratively minimized by varying ξt using a Nelder-Mead simplex method.
Case I: Terminal cost (4) with z
.
= 0 and Pt
.
= I2. A pair of optimal trajectories for this terminal
cost case is illustrated in Figure 2a, corresponding to the barrier cost being active or inactive, i.e.
included or excluded, in the cost (2), (23). The circle included identifies the boundary of the state
constraint imposed. An initial state of x
.
= [ 1.6 −1.6 ]′ for dynamics (5) is assumed. Figures 3a and
4a illustrate the optimal inputs α˜∗ and u˜∗ of (91) respectively. By inspection of the unconstrained
case, α˜∗ attains its maximum value of M = 50 where the constraint is violated. However, as α˜∗ does
not influence the control in the unconstrained case, the trajectory is not adjusted accordingly. In
contrast, in the active constraint case, α˜∗ attains a maximum of approximately 35 as the trajectory
approaches the constraint. By inspection, the state constraint is not violated, due to the intervention
evident in the large actuated control u˜∗ that ensues.
Case II: Terminal cost (4) with z
.
= [ 1 1 ]′ and Pt
.
= 10 I2. The terminal cost is adjusted in this
case so as to encourage the trajectory to move towards the non-zero terminal state ξt = z = [ 1 1 ]
′,
while respecting the state constraint. Figures 2b, 3b, and 4b illustrate respectively the corresponding
state trajectories, the optimal input α˜∗, and the optimal control u˜∗ obtained, by solving TPBVP (90),
with the constraint inactive and active.
Note that in both cases, the log barrier function φ of the form specified in (93) yields
φ(ρ) = − log(1− ρ
b2
), φ′(ρ) =
1
b2 − ρ, φ
′′(ρ) =
1
(b2 − ρ)2 ,
a(β) = b2 β − log(b2 β)− 1, a′(β) = (φ′)−1(β) = b2 − 1
β
, a′′(β) =
1
β2
,
(φ′)−1(β) = b2 − 1
β
, a−1(α) = − 1
b2
W−1(− exp(−1− α)), (a′)−1(ρ) = φ′(ρ) = 1
b2 − ρ,
in which W−1 is the −1 branch of the Lambert-W function. In practice, it was found that evaluating
the inverses numerically was sufficiently accurate and fast, e.g. solving α = a(β) for β given α.
7 Conclusions
A sup-of-quadratics representation is developed for a class of convex barrier functions of interest in
implementing state constraints in linear regulator problems. Using this representation, an equivalent
unconstrained two player linear quadratic game is constructed. By demonstrating equivalence of its
upper and lower values, an approach to computation is presented, and illustrated by example.
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Figure 2: State trajectory with state constraint active and inactive (Cases I and II).
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Figure 3: Optimal input α˜∗ (Cases I and II).
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Figure 4: Optimal control u˜∗ (Cases I and II).
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A Some useful properties of the barrier and its dual
Lemma A.1. Given φ satisfying (7), the function a of (8) is well-defined, differentiable, and strictly
increasing, and has a well-defined, differentiable, and strictly increasing first derivative a′ and inverse
a−1, and a well-defined, strictly positive second derivative a′′, satisfying
a′ : R≥φ′(0) → [0, b2), a′(β) = (φ′)−1(β), (94)
a′′ : R≥φ′(0) → R>0, a′′(β) =
1
φ′′ ◦ (φ′)−1(β) . (95)
a−1 : R≥−φ(0) → R≥φ′(0), a−1(−φ(0)) = φ′(0), (96)
(a−1)′ : R≥−φ(0) → R+>1/b2 , (a−1)′(α) =
1
a′ ◦ a−1(α) , (97)
lim
α↑∞
(a−1)′(α) = 1/b2, lim
α↓−φ(0)
(a−1)′(α) = +∞. (98)
Proof. By inspection of (8), and the properties of (φ′)−1 provided by (7) (v), it is evident that a is
well-defined on R≥φ′(0). Note further that [(φ
′)−1]′(β) = 1/[φ′′ ◦(φ′)−1(β)] for all β ∈ R≥φ′(0), in which
the denominator is strictly positive by (7) (i), (v). Hence, a is differentiable by inspection of (8), and
the chain rule yields a′(β) = (φ′)−1(β) + β [(φ′)−1]′(β) − [φ ◦ (φ′)−1(β)] [(φ′)−1]′(β) = (φ′)−1(β) for
all β ∈ R≥φ′(0). Consequently, a′ = (φ′)−1 is well-defined and strictly increasing, with a′ : R≥φ′(0) →
[0, b2), by (7) (v). That is, (94) holds. As a′(φ′(0)) = 0 (by substitution), the strict increase property
of a′ implies that a′(β) ∈ R>0 for all β ∈ (φ′(0),∞). Hence, a is also strictly increasing, and so (8)
implies that a(β) ≥ a(φ′(0)) = −φ(0) for all β ∈ [φ′(0),∞). By the same strict increase property of
a′, note further that there exists an ǫ > 0 and βǫ > φ
′(0) such that a′(β) ≥ ǫ > 0 for all β ≥ βǫ.
Consequently, limβ→∞ a(β) ≥ limβ→∞[(β − βǫ) ǫ + a(βǫ)] = ∞. Hence, a(β) ∈ [−φ(0),∞) for all
β ∈ [φ′(0),∞), which confirms the range of a specified in (8).
By inspection of (94) and (7) (i), a′ is differentiable with derivative a′′ given by a′′(β) = [(φ′)−1]′(β) =
1/[φ′′ ◦ (φ′)−1(β)] for all β ∈ R≥φ′(0), which (as indicated previously) is strictly positive by (7) (i), (v).
Hence, (95) holds.
As a is strictly increasing, the existence of its strictly increasing inverse a−1, with domain and
range specified by (96), follows immediately from (8). The chain rule and (94) subsequently imply
that a−1 is also differentiable, with derivative (97). There, the range of this derivative follows by (7)
(v), (94). The two limits in (98) follow directly from (97), with
lim
α↑∞
(a−1)′(α) = lim
α↑∞
1
a′ ◦ a−1(α) =
1
limα↑∞(φ′)−1 ◦ a−1(α) =
1
limβ↑∞(φ′)−1(β)
=
1
b2
,
lim
α↓−φ(0)
(a−1)′(α) =
1
limβ↓φ′(0)(φ′)−1(β)
= +∞,
These limits, along with the fact that (a−1)′ is decreasing, confirm the range in (97).
Lemma A.2. Given ρ ∈ R≥0, and a−1 as per (96), the map γρ : R≥−φ(0) → R defined by
γρ(α)
.
= a−1(α) ρ − α, ρ ∈ R≥0, (99)
is twice differentiable with derivatives γ′ρ : R>−φ(0) → (ρ/b2 − 1,∞) and γ′′ρ : R>−φ(0) → R<0 given by
γ′ρ(α) =
ρ
a′ ◦ a−1(α) − 1 =
ρ
ρˆ(α)
− 1, γ′′ρ (α) = −ρ
a′′ ◦ a−1(α)
[a′ ◦ a−1(α)]3 =
−ρ
φ′′ ◦ ρˆ(α) [ρˆ(α)]3 (100)
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with ρˆ as per (15). If ρ ∈ R≥b2 , then α 7→ γρ(α) is strictly increasing with limα→∞ γρ(α) = +∞.
Lemma A.3. Given M ∈ R≥−φ(0),
0 ≥ φ(0) + φ′(0) ρ− Φ(ρ) ∀ ρ ≥ 0, (101)
0 ≥ φ(0) + φ′(0) ρ− a−1(M) ρ +M ∀ ρ ≥ ρˆ(M), (102)
0 ≥ λM+ (β) ∀ β ≤ a−1(−φ(0)), (103)
0 ≥ λM+ (β)− a(β)− φ(0) ∀ β ∈ [a−1(−φ(0)), a−1(M)], (104)
in which a, a−1, ρˆ(M) are given by (8), (96), (15), and λM+ : R→ R is defined by
λM+ (β)
.
=M + φ(0) − (a−1(M)− β) ρˆ(M). (105)
Proof. [Inequality (101)] See Corollary 3.6.
[Inequality (102)] Fix M ∈ R≥−φ(0). As a−1(M) ≥ a−1(−φ(0)),
φ(0) + φ′(0) ρ − a−1(M) ρ+M =M + φ(0)− [a−1(M)− a−1(−φ(0))] ρ
≤M + φ(0)− [a−1(M)− a−1(−φ(0))] ρˆ(M) = λM+ (a−1(−φ(0))),
for any ρ ≥ ρˆ(M) = a′ ◦ a−1(M) ∈ [0, b2), see (15), (94), where λM+ is as per (105). Hence, inequality
(102) is a special case of inequality (103).
[Inequality (103)] There are two cases to consider, namely, (i) M = −φ(0), and (ii) M > −φ(0).
(i) Fix M = −φ(0). By inspection of the definition of λM+ and (15), (96),
λM+ (β) = −(a−1(−φ(0)) − β) ρˆ(−φ(0)) = −(a−1(−φ(0)) − β) (φ′)−1 ◦ a−1(−φ(0))
= −(a−1(−φ(0)) − β) (φ′)−1 ◦ φ′(0) = 0 , (106)
so that (103) holds.
(ii) Alternatively, fix M > −φ(0). Differentiating (105), (λM+ )′(β) = ρˆ(M) ∈ (0, b2) for all β ∈ R,
see (15). Hence, λM+ (β) is strictly increasing in β ∈ R. In particular, β ≤ a−1(−φ(0)) implies that
λM+ (β) ≤ λM+ (a−1(−φ(0))) = µ(M), where µ ∈ C(R≥−φ(0);R) is defined by µ(α) .= α + φ(0) −
(a−1(α)− a−1(−φ(0))) ρˆ(α) for all α ∈ R≥−φ(0). Recall the derivative of a−1 from (97), and similarly
differentiate ρˆ via (15), yielding (a−1)′(α) = 1/(a′ ◦ a−1(α)) = 1/ρˆ(α) > 0, ρˆ′(α) = (a′′ ◦ a−1(α))/(a′ ◦
a−1(α)) = 1/([φ′′ ◦ ρˆ(α)] ρˆ(α)) > 0, for all α ∈ R>−φ(0). Note that neither derivative is defined at
α = −φ(0), as a′ ◦ a−1(−φ(0)) = 0. Hence, by inspection of its definition above, µ is differentiable
on R>−φ(0), with the product rule yielding µ
′(α) = [a−1(α) − a−1(−φ(0))] ([φ′′ ◦ ρˆ(α)] ρˆ(α))−1 < 0,
for all α ∈ R>−φ(0). That is, µ is continuous on R≥−φ(0) and strictly decreasing on R>−φ(0), so that
0 = µ(−φ(0)) > µ(M) = λM+ (a−1(−φ(0))) ≥ λM+ (β) for all β ≤ a−1(−φ(0)), as required by (103).
[Inequality (104)] Again there are two cases to consider, (i) M = −φ(0), and (ii) M > −φ(0).
(i) Fix M = −φ(0). Recall in this case that λM+ (β) = 0 for all β ∈ R, see (106). Hence,
recalling that a is strictly increasing, the right-hand side of (104) for β ∈ [a−1(−φ(0)), a−1(M)] is
λM+ (β)− a(β)− φ(0) = −a(β)− φ(0) ≤ a ◦ a−1(−φ(0)))− φ(0) = 0, so that (104) holds.eq:Gamma-p-
M-and-beta-p-star-M
(ii) Alternatively, fix M > −φ(0). Define η ∈ C([−φ(0),M ];R) by η(α) .= λM+ ◦ a−1(α)− α for all
α ∈ [−φ(0),M ]. By inspection, η is differentiable on (−φ(0),M ], with
η′(α) = (λM+ )
′ ◦ a−1(α) (a−1)′(α)− 1 = ρˆ(M) (a−1)′(α) − 1 = a
′ ◦ a−1(M)
a′ ◦ a−1(α) − 1 > 0 ,
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for all α ∈ (−φ(0),M ], in which the final inequality follows as a′, a−1 are strictly increasing. Again
note that differentiability is lost at α = −φ(0), as a′ ◦ a−1(−φ(0)) = (φ′)−1(φ′(0)) = 0. Hence, µ
is continuous on [−φ(0),M ] and strictly increasing on (−φ(0),M ], so that η(α) ≤ η(M) = λM+ ◦
a−1(M) −M = φ(0) for all α ∈ [−φ(0),M ]. Setting α = a(β) for β ∈ [a−1(−φ(0)), a−1(M)] yields
λM+ (β)− a(β) ≤ φ(0), as required by (104).
B Proof of Lemmas 3.1 and 3.4
Proof. [Lemma 3.1] The barrier function Φ of (6) is closed and convex on R by (6), (7), [15, (3.8),
pp.15,17]. Hence, there exists a one-to-one pairing between Φ and its Fenchel transform Θ = Φ∗, as
indicated by (10), see [15, Theorem 5, p.16]. The objectives are to establish the explicit form (10) of
the function Θ, its range, and the optimizers (11) attending the suprema in (10). To this end, note
by inspection of (6) and the definition of Θ in (10) that
Θ(β) = sup
ρ∈[0,b2)
πβ(ρ), πβ(ρ)
.
= β ρ− φ(ρ), (107)
for all β ∈ R, ρ ∈ [0, b2). If β ∈ R≥φ′(0), the supremum is attained at ρ = ρ∗ = (φ′)−1(β), as
0 = π′β(ρ
∗) = β − φ′(ρ∗). Note by (7) (v) that ρ∗ ∈ [0, b2). The supremum is then πβ(ρ∗) =
β (φ′)−1(β) − φ ◦ (φ′)−1(β) .= a(β), as per (8). Alternatively, if β ∈ R<φ′(0), (7) (iv) implies that
π′β(ρ) = β − φ′(ρ) < φ′(0) − φ′(ρ) ≤ 0 for ρ ∈ [0, b2). Hence, the supremum must be achieved at
ρ∗ = 0, and πβ(ρ
∗) = −φ(0). Combining both of the above cases immediately yields the right-hand
equations in (10) and (11).
In order to demonstrate that the left-hand equality in (11), holds, note by (10) that
Φ(ρ) = max{Γ−(ρ), Γ+(ρ)}, (108)
Γ−(ρ)
.
= sup
β<φ′(0)
{β ρ+ φ(0)} =
{
+∞, ρ ∈ R<0,
φ(0) + φ′(0) ρ, ρ ∈ R≥0, (109)
Γ+(ρ)
.
= sup
β≥φ′(0)
χβ(ρ), χρ(β)
.
= β ρ− a(β), (110)
for all β, ρ ∈ R. The supremum in (109) is achieved at
β = βˆ∗−(ρ)
.
=
{ −∞, ρ ∈ R<0,
φ′(0), ρ ∈ R≥0. (111)
In considering Γ+ of (110), recall that a of (8) is differentiable by Lemma A.1, with derivative given
by (94). Three cases are subsequently considered, (i) ρ ∈ [0, b2), (ii) ρ ∈ R<0, and (iii) ρ ∈ R≥b2 .
(i) ρ ∈ [0, b2): As a′(β) = (φ′)−1(β) is well-defined for all β ∈ R≥φ′(0), see (94), χρ is differentiable
with χ′ρ(β) = ρ − (φ′)−1(β) for all β ∈ R≥φ′(0). Substituting β = β∗ .= φ′(ρ) ∈ R≥φ′(0) yields
χ′ρ(β
∗) = ρ − (φ′)−1(β∗) = 0. Hence, the supremum in (110) is attained at β = β∗, with χρ(β∗) =
ρφ′(ρ) − a ◦ φ′(ρ) = ρφ′(ρ) − [φ′(ρ) ρ − φ(ρ)] = φ(ρ). (ii) ρ ∈ R<0: As a′ has a nonnegative range,
see (94), χ′ρ(β) = ρ − a′(β) < −a′(β) ≤ 0 for all β ∈ R≥φ′(0). Hence, the supremum in (110) is
achieved at β∗ = φ′(0), and χρ(β
∗) = φ′(0) ρ− [0−φ(0)] = φ(0)+φ′(0) ρ. (iii) ρ ∈ R≥b2 : Observe that
χρ(β) = γρ ◦a(β) for all β ∈ R≥φ′(0), in which γρ is defined in (99). As a : R≥φ′(0) → R≥−φ(0) is strictly
increasing and has an unbounded range, Lemma A.2 implies that limβ→∞ χρ(β) = limβ→∞ γρ ◦a(β) =
∞. Hence, the supremum in (110) is achieved at β∗ =∞, and χρ(β∗) =∞.
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Combining cases (i) – (iii), Γ+ of (110) may be written explicitly as
Γ+(ρ) =

φ(0) + φ′(0) ρ, ρ ∈ R<0,
φ(ρ), ρ ∈ [0, b2),
+∞, ρ ∈ R≥b2 ,
β = β∗ = βˆ∗+(ρ)
.
=

φ′(0), ρ ∈ R<0,
φ′(ρ), ρ ∈ [0, b2),
+∞, ρ ∈ R≥b2 .
(112)
with the supremum achieved at the β∗ = βˆ∗+(ρ) specified. Combining (108) with (109), (112), and the
fact that φ(ρ) ≥ φ(0) + φ′(0) ρ for all ρ ∈ [0, b2) by (7) (i), yields (6). Similarly, combining (111) and
(112) yields the left-hand equation in (11).
Proof. [Lemma 3.4] (i) Fix M ∈ R≥−φ(0). By the monotonicity of a−1, see Lemma A.1 and (96), note
that a−1(M) ≥ a−1(−φ(0)) = φ′(0). Hence, recalling (15), and subsequently (10),
ΦM(ρ) = max
{
sup
β<φ′(0)
{β ρ+ φ(0)}, sup
β∈[φ′(0),a−1(M)]
{β ρ−Θ(β)}
}
= max{Γ−(ρ), ΓM+ (ρ)}, (113)
where Γ− is as per (109), and Γ
M
+ (ρ)
.
= supβ∈[φ′(0),a−1(M)]{β ρ − a(β)}. Modifying the argument
preceding (112) in the proof of Lemma 3.1,
ΓM+ (ρ) =

φ(0) + φ′(0) ρ, ρ ∈ R<0,
φ(ρ), ρ ∈ [0, ρˆ(M)],
a−1(M) ρ−M, ρ ∈ R>ρˆ(M),
(114)
with the supremum achieved at the β = βˆM∗+ (ρ) specified. The pointwise maximum (113) may be
evaluated via (109), (114), and the inequalities (101), (102) of Lemma A.3. Indeed, inspection of (113),
(109), (114), (101), (102) immediately yields (16). The optimizer (17) that achieves the supremum in
(15) follows by matching the corresponding cases in (111), (114).
(ii) In view of ΦM , ρˆ(M) of (16), (15), define
L
.
= ΦM ◦ ρˆ(M) = φ ◦ (φ′)−1 ◦ a−1(M), U .= a−1(M) ρˆ(M)−M = a−1(M) (φ′)−1 ◦ a−1(M)−M,
for M ∈ R≥−φ(0). With β¯ .= a−1(M), note that L = φ ◦ (φ′)−1(β¯) and U = β¯ (φ′)−1(β¯)−M , so that
U − L = [β¯ (φ′)−1(β¯)− φ ◦ (φ′)−1(β¯)]−M = a(β¯)−M = a ◦ a−1(M)−M = 0, via (8). That is, ΦM
is continuous at ρˆ(M), and ΦM ∈ C(R≥0;R). By inspection of (16),
(ΦM )′(ρ) =
{
φ′(ρ), ρ ∈ (0, ρˆ(M)),
a−1(M), ρ ∈ (ρˆ(M),∞),
and limρ↑ρˆ(M)(Φ
M )′(ρ) = φ′◦ρˆ(M) = a−1(M) = limρ↓ρˆ(M)(ΦM )′(ρ) via (15). Hence, ΦM ∈ C(R≥0;R)∩
C1(R>0;R). As (Φ
M )′ is non-decreasing on R>0, and infinite elsewhere, Φ
M : R→ R+ is (lower) closed
convex on R, see for example [15, (3.8), pp.15,17].
(iii) Follows by inspection of (6), (10), (15), via Lemma 3.1. 
(iv) The following claim is first demonstrated.
Claim: Given M ∈ R≥−φ(0), there exists ΘM : R→ R+≥−φ(0) such that
ΦM (ρ) = sup
β∈R
{β ρ−ΘM(β)}, (115)
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ΘM(β) = sup
ρ∈R
{β ρ− ΦM (ρ)} =

−φ(0), β ∈ R<φ′(0),
a(β), β ∈ [φ′(0), a−1(M)],
+∞, β ∈ R>a−1(M),
(116)
for all ρ, β ∈ R, with φ, a as per (7), (8).
Proof of Claim: Convexity assertion (ii) and [15, Theorem 5, p.16] imply that their exists a one-
to-one pairing between ΦM and its Fenchel transform ΘM : R → R+ as per (115) and the left-hand
equation in (116). It remains to show that the right-hand equation in (116) holds.
By (16), the supremum in the left-hand equation in (116) is never achieved at ρ ∈ R<0. Hence,
ΘM (β) = max{ΛM− (β), ΛM+ (β)}, (117)
ΛM− (β)
.
= sup
ρ∈[0,ρˆ(M)]
πβ(ρ), Λ
M
+ (β)
.
= sup
ρ∈R>ρˆ(M)
{(β − a−1(M)) ρ +M}, (118)
for all β ∈ R, with πβ as per (107). Replacing b2 with ρˆ(M) in the argument following (107) yields
ΛM− (β) =

−φ(0), β ∈ R<φ′(0),
a(β), β ∈ [φ′(0), a−1(M)],
λM− (β), β ∈ R>a−1(M),
λM− (β)
.
= β ρˆ(M)− φ ◦ ρˆ(M). (119)
By inspection of (118), and recalling (105),
ΛM+ (β) =
{
λM+ (β)− φ(0) , β ∈ R≤a−1(M) ,
∞ , β ∈ R>a−1(M) . (120)
Hence, the pointwise maximum in (117) may be evaluated by (119), (120) and inequalities (103), (104)
from Lemma A.3 in Appendix A, which yields the right-hand equation in (116). 
Returning to the proof of (iv), by Lemma A.1, there exists an M1 ∈ R≥−φ(0) such that a−1(M) ∈
R>0 for all M ∈ R≥M1 . Meanwhile, applying the above claim, in particular (116), ΘM (0) =
supρ∈R{−ΦM (ρ)} for any M ∈ R≥−φ(0). Hence, recalling (116),
cˆ
.
= inf
M≥M1
inf
ρ∈R
ΦM(ρ) = − sup
M≥M1
ΘM (0) =
{
φ(0), 0 ∈ R<φ′(0),
φ ◦ (φ′)−1(0), 0 ∈ R≥φ′(0),
so that the assertion is proved for any c ∈ R satisfying c < cˆ ∈ R, as required.
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